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Psychology

Splitting and Mood Congruent Recall of Previously SelfReferenced Trait Adjectives: Is There a Relationship? (pp.

155)

Director: Charles K. Allen C ^ 4
The present study was undertaken as a first attempt to
examine the relationship between the phenomenon of mood
congruent recall and the defense mechanism of splitting.
Because of the difficulties inherent in using an actual
clinical population, an analog paradigm was utilized.
In a
pre-screening, subjects filled out the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory-II Borderline Scale (MCMI-II BPD
Scale), and two scales designed to measure the splitting
defense (the Image Distorting Defense subscale of the
Defense Style Questionnaire, and the Splitting Scale), and a
median split procedure was used to classify subjects as high
or low scorers. All subjects received a mood induction and
then rated whether 54 trait adjectives (chosen from the top
and bottom thirds of Anderson's likableness norms) applied
to them or not. After a distractor task and another mood
induction, incidental recall for these adjectives was
tested.
Both
self-referencing congruency
and recall
congruency of
the high and low scorers of
both sexeswas
compared, utilizing four factor analyses of variance, with
three between subjects factors (mood condition, personality,
and sex) and one within subjects factor (congruent and noncongruent adjectives). The dependent measure for the first
analysis was the number of adjectives self-referenced.
For
the second analysis it was the number of adjectives
recalled.
It
was hypothesized that lower
scorers would show
self-referencing and recall congruency in positive moods
only but that higher scorers would show congruency in both
positive and negative moods. The experimental hypotheses
were not supported.
Instead, subjects generally
demonstrated a positive bias in both self-referencing and
recall, regardless of mood condition. However, higher
scorers on the Splitting Scale and females who were higher
scorers on the MCMI-II BPD Scale demonstrated significantly
less positive bias than did other subjects, again regardless
of mood. Possible reasons for and implications of this
finding are discussed.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION

Can the "splitting1* of individuals with borderline
personality disorder be explained as being the result of the
effects of mood states on memory and cognition?

Or to put__

it another way, can the splitting defense be operationalized
as mood congruent memory?

This study was designed as a

first attempt to answer this question.

Borderline Personality Disorder

The central feature of borderline personality disorder is
a pervasive instability of mood, self-image and
interpersonal relationships (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 1987).
A marked and persistent identity disturbance is
almost invariably present. This is often
pervasive, and is manifested by uncertainty about
several life issues, such as self-image, sexual
orientation, long-term goals or career choice,
types of friends or lovers to have, or which
values to adopt. The person often experiences
this instability of self-image as chronic feelings
of emptiness or boredom.
Interpersonal relationships are usually unstable
and intense, and may be characterized by
alteration of the extremes of overidealization and
devaluation. These people have difficulty
tolerating being alone, and will make frantic
efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.
Affective instability is common. This may be
evidenced by marked shifts from baseline mood to
depression, irritability, or anxiety, usually
lasting a few hours or, only rarely, more than a
few days.
In addition, these people often have
1
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inappropriately intense anger or lack of control
over their anger, with freguent displays of temper
or recurrent physical fights.
They tend to be
impulsive, particularly in activities that are
potentially self-damaging, such as spending
sprees, psychoactive substance abuse, reckless
driving, casual sex, shoplifting, and binge
eating.
Recurrent suicidal threats, gestures, or
behavior and other self-mutilating behavior (e.g.,
wrist scratching) are common in the more severe
forms of this disorder. This behavior may serve
to manipulate others, may be a result of intense
anger, or may counteract feelings of numbness and
depersonalization that arise during periods of
extreme stress.
Some conceptualize this disorder as a level of
personality organization rather than as a specific
personality disorder.
(p. 346)
Other Axis I or Axis II disorders are often present, and
individuals with this disorder often have histories which
include many different previous diagnoses.

Their most

salient feature is often the intensity and changeability of
their affective states (Millon, 1981).

Common complications

are Major Depression, Dysthymia, Psychoactive Substance
Abuse, and Brief Reactive Psychosis (APA, 1987).

This

disorder is more often diagnosed in females than in males,
and premature death from suicide is a real risk (APA, 1987).
This disorder differs from cyclothymia in that while the
borderline and the cyclothymic both manifest affective
instability, the borderline does not manifest hypomanic
episodes and the cyclothymic does.

In some cases, however,

both diagnoses may be warranted (DSM-III-R).

i
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Borderline personality disorder only made its way into the
official diagnostic nomenclature in 1980, with the
publication of DSM-III (Millon, 1981).

Prior to that time

the term was often used casually by clinicians to indicate
that a patient was on the border, often between neurosis and
psychosis (Millon, 1981).

It was the work of diverse

psychoanalytic theorists who focused mainly on intrapsychic
features of the disorder that was primarily responsible for
the delineation, development and popularization of the
concept (Millon, 1981).

As the concept developed, however,

others focused on the relationship between borderline and
both affective and psychotic disorders.

Integrating the two

traditions, Spitzer (1979), delineated two subgroups of
borderline disorders, the schizotypal borderline and the
unstable borderline, which evolved into the DSM-III
Schizotypal and Borderline Personality Disorders.

According

to Millon (1981), the name Borderline PErsonality Disorder
was chosen for the unstable borderline basically to appease
the psychoanalytic theorists who had contributed so much to
the development of the concept, although others felt that a
name such as cycloid, unstable, ambivalent, erratic,
impulsive, or labile personality would have been more
descriptive.

Borderline Personality Disorder is conceptualized quite
differently by different theorists.

Some, such as Millon
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(1981) and many psychoanalytic theorists (e.g. Kernberg,
1975), see personality functioning as occupying a continuum
between healthy and psychotic.

To these theorists,

Borderline personality is not conceptualized as a discrete
homogenous syndrome but as a level of pathology or
personality organization.

-hdisagreement.
.

But this is not the only area of

.

.

.

Some attribute the etiology of this disorder

to environmental influences, others see it as resulting from
inherent predispositions, and still others see it as
resulting from the interaction of the two.

Most

psychodynamic theorists view this disorder as resulting from
the failure of the patient to negotiate a specific
developmental stage, but theorists such as Millon (1981)
view it as resulting form the cumulative effects of the
patient's whole life experience.

Various subgroups of

patients with this disorder are identified by theorists,
either on the basis of hypothesized relationships with other
disorders, or on the basis of developmental differences, or
some combination of both.

Theorists such as Davis and Akiskal (1986) and Klein
(1977) take a biogenic tack.

They point to the

heterogeneity within the borderline syndrome.

Basing their

work on family studies showing an increased risk of
alcoholism, bipolar depression and borderline personality
disorder in first degree relatives of patients with
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borderline personality disorder, different pharmacological
responses in subgroups of patients, and neurochemical
abnormalities in primates whose early attachment bonds were
^disturbed, they suggest that borderline personality disorder
is actually a group of different syndromes with similar
iehavioral manifestations.

Millon's (1981) theory integrates the biological findings
with social learning theory.

As noted previously, he views

personality traits as lying on a continuum of adaptiveness.
In his view, borderline personality disorder is one of three
severe personality disorders, along with paranoid and
schizotypal personality disorders, which represent
deteriorated but stable more dysfunctional versions of less
pathological personality disorders.

Millon describes four

subtypes of the borderline personality pattern; the
borderline/dependent, the borderline/compulsive, the
borderline/histrionic, and the borderline/passiveaggressive.

He sees the same etiological factors at work in

the lives of these patients as in their less severe
variations.

He states:

The primary difference between them are the
intensity, frequency, timing, and persistence of a
host of potentially pathogenic features. Those
who function at the borderline level may begin
with less adequate constitutional equipment or be
subjected to a series of more adverse early
experiences.
(1981, p. 364)
Most psychodynamic theorists view borderline personality

as a level of intrapsychic structural organization rather
than as a specific personality disorder (Meissner, 1978).
In this view, the borderline is seen as having some traits
more usually associated with neurosis and some traits more
usually associated with psychosis and as therefore not
^fitting into either classification.

While psychotics are

thought to manifest identity diffusion, primitive defense
mechanisms, and loss of reality contact and neurotics are
thought to manifest none of these symptoms, borderlines are
thought to manifest identity diffusion and primitive
_defenses but not a loss of reality contact (Settlage, 1977)
Neurosis is viewed as resulting from Oedipal conflicts, and
both psychosis and borderline personality organization are
viewed as resulting from pre-oedipal conflicts.

Psychotics

are viewed as not having successfully negotiated the very
earliest stage of development, in which the self and the
mother are differentiated as separate objects, and
borderlines are seen as having difficulty in a later stage
in which object constancy develops.

It is the borderline's

development of and reliance on the splitting defense and
other subsidiary defenses that results in the lack of
behavioral and internal integration that is observed in
individuals with this disorder.

7

Splitting

The concept of splitting is central to the modern
psychodynamic conceptualizations of borderline personality
disorder and is thought to be of both etiological and
diagnostic importance.

However, as Pruyser (1975) and

Marmar and Horowitz (1986) point out, there is a great deal
of confusion regarding the term splitting, and it is used in
very different ways by different theorists.

Kernberg (1975), who's work was of central importance in
the development of the borderline concept, defines splitting
as:
an essential defensive operation of the borderline
personality organization which underlies all
others that follow.
It has to be stressed that I
am using the term splitting in a restricted and
limited sense, referring only to the active
process of keeping apart introjections and
identifications of opposite quality.
(p. 75)
In an earlier publication (1966), Kernberg states "what is
split is not only affect states of the ego but also object
images and self images" (p. 245).

In developing his theory,

Kernberg drew on the work of Mahler (1968, 1971), who
posited that pathological splitting resulted from
difficulties in negotiating the rapproachment subphase of
the separation-individuation stage of development.
According to Mahler, some children may "split the object
world, more permanently than is optimal, into 'good' and
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'bad7.

By means of this splitting, the 'good7 object is

defended against the derivatives of the aggressive drive"
(1971, p. 413).

As Lichtenberg and Slap (1973) note, "Both

Mahler and Kernberg suggest that the earliest infantile
experiences give rise to an organization of two sets of
memory traces" (p. 777).

These exist as "memory islands

which contain imprints of 'pleasurable-good' or 'painfulbad' stimuli" (Mahler, 1968, p. 44).

As a child matures, he

or she becomes able to integrate these separate images and
to perceive objects as wholes, except when these objects are
the target of intense ambivalence.

When object constancy is

achieved, the child can substitute for the absent mother "a
reliable internal image that remains relatively stable
irrespective of the state of instinctual need or inner
discomfort" (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975, p. 110).

This

implies the "unifying of the 'good' and 'bad' object into
one whole representation (p. 110).

Lichtenberg and Slap

(1973) liken the two stages (pre and post object constancy)
to the difference between a B movie and an A movie, "in the
former the characters are all clearly good or evil, they are
one dimensional; the characters in am A movie are more
complicated, they have depth, they suffer from internal
conflicts, and their characters have good and bad aspects."
Mahler (1971) suggests that the development of pathological
splitting may be the result of inadeguate mothering, while
Kernberg (1975) stresses innate constitutional factors, even
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suggesting that there may be a biologically based lack of
integrative ability.

Pruyser (1975), questioning the defensive nature of
splitting, says of Kernberg's work:
His case material and that of others concerned
with borderline conditions give justification for
describing the patients' attitudes, transference
reactions, emotional expressions, motor behaviors,
and dealings with other people as appearing, at
times, split and their intentions as splitting.
But here these words are used in the
phenomenological sense describing behaviors being
disjointed, fiercely contrasting with each other,
staccato in their sudden flip-flops, and utterly
lacking in that suavity, elegance, mutual
softening, nice blending, or commonsensical giveand-take that we all see as the goal of desirable
integration.
The question is: Why should we
invent a special intrapsychic act of splitting to
account for these phenomena as if some internal
chopper were at work to produce them?
(p. 43)
Volkan (1976), however, who's conceptualization agrees with
that Kernberg (1975), Mahler (1971), and Lichtenberg and
Slap (1973), cites as evidence for the defensive nature of
splitting clinical examples in which patients are flooded
with intense primitive anxiety when their therapist
encourages them to integrate split representations.

Dorpat (1979), from a slightly different perspective from
that Pruyser, questions the need to posit a specific defense
mechanism of splitting, suggesting that the behaviors that
are attributed to splitting can all be accounted for by the
defense mechanism of denial.

He suggests that in the
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phenomenon that is called splitting, what is denied is the
anger toward the need-fulfilling object, which results in
the extreme alternations of affect toward objects that is
usually referred to as splitting.

Brenner (1981) counters

with the argument that while denial of some aspect of
reality is definitely an aspect of splitting, it is actually
an aspect of all defensive operations.

Adding to the confusion, Kohut (1981) uses the terms
vertical splitting and horizontal splitting to refer to two
possibly very different processes that occur in narcissistic
patients' the term vertical splitting refers to grandiosity
and disavowed feelings of shame and low self esteem (this
may be equivalent to the splitting of borderlines), and the
term horizontal splitting refers to the split between
primitive narcissistic needs and somewhat realistic
expectations of others.

Although Masterson's (1985) theory differs generally from
that of Kernberg (1975), his conceptualization of the
defense mechanism of splitting is very similar to Kernberg's
and Mahler's (1971).

He speaks of rewarding and withdrawing

part-units, which each consist of a part-self
representation, a part-object representation, and a linking
affect.

Like Mahler, he stresses the role of maternal

libidinal non-availability in the development of the
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splitting defense.

Grostein (1981) distinguishes between two types of
splitting, the first being an adaptive cognitive perceptual,
discriminatory process which aids in adaptation, and the
latter a defense mechanism.

In agreement with Kernberg

(1975), he postulates that in this second form of splitting,
good and bad images of the self and others are kept apart to
avoid the anxiety inherent in the contamination of the good^
object by aspects of the bad object.

Stolorow and Lachmann (1978) distinguish between what they
term pre-stage splitting and defensive splitting, the first
representing arrested development and the second, like the
splitting of Kernberg, representing a defense against
structural conflicts.

Pre-stage splitting results from the

inability of an individual to achieve object constancy,
while in defensive splitting the individual possesses the
ability to integrate opposing images but keeps them separate
for defensive purposes.

Cooper and Arnow (1984) have

applied Stolorow and Lachmann's conceptualization to
analyses of Rorschach responses and believe that they can
distinguish the two types of splitting in Rorschach
protocols.

Melito (1983) approaches the concept of splitting from a
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more cognitive perspective.

He integrates Piagetian stages

of cognitive development with psychodynamic notions of
splitting and argues for the congruity of the two
approaches.

Central in his analysis are the Piagetian

concepts of centering and decentering.

Noting that the

period in which object constancy and defensive splitting
develop in Kernberg's and Mahler's theories coincides with
the transition from the sensori-motor stage to the preoperational stage in Piagetian thought, he posits the
existence of "developmental" and "defensive splitting".
Developmental splitting is stage appropriate behavior and
results from the child's centration, or "concentration of
attention on a single thing such that different aspects of
reality are merely registered and not coordinated into an
organized system of relations" (p. 521).

At the beginning

of the pre-operational period, the child has difficulty
"decentering onto memories of other perceptions relating to
the same content or situation" (p. 525).

True conceptual

thought does not yet exist and concepts are understood in
terms of prototypes.

As intuitive thought (the second stage

of pre-operational thought) develops, the child becomes abid
to decenter his or her attention onto other images.
Speaking of the differences between developmental and
defensive splitting, Melito states,
If a subject is unable to integrate introjects
because of cognitive immaturity (or even cognitive
defect), we cannot speak of the resultant
splitting as defensive since the resultant state

is without motive. We can speak of splitting as a
defense if the subject has the proven cognitive
capacity (as perhaps demonstrated with respect to
more neutral content) to decenter percepts and
images and integrate them.
(p. 530)
Thus, although he expresses agreement with Kernberg's
formulations, his own formulation would suggest that if, as
Kernberg (1966) has suggested, individuals who utilize the
splitting defense have a constitutional, physiological
inability to integrate opposing representations, then their
splitting cannot be considered as defensive.

Horowitz (1977) and Marraar and Horowitz (1986) also
approach splitting from a somewhat cognitive perspective,
integrating cognitive and psychodynamic formulations.
Horowitz (1977) states, "In terms of cognitive structure,
splitting refers to a segregation and multiplication of
inner schema of self and other.

Instead of integrated,

realistic, and coherent self- and object- models, the person
schematizes role dyads on the basis of multiple /good/ and
'bad' self and object images." (p. 550).

Marmar and

Horowitz (1986) describe splitting as "the dissociation
between two unique states" (p. 27) and state that its
defensive purpose is to protect the individual from the
disorganizing affects that would be entailed in a realistic,
integrated image of the object.

They summarize the relevant

literature as follows:
Splitting refers to the segregation of the mental
representations of the self and others, such that
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part rather than whole images are formed. Objects
may be seen as either all good or all bad rather
than having both good and bad attributes.
Similarly, strong currents of contradictory
feelings, such as love for a person who is
gratifying and hatred when the same person is at
another point in time frustrating, are kept apart.
When feelings of anger emerge toward the
frustrating object, the person has no access to
modulating memories of previous positive feelings
which might temper the reaction to frustration.
^The sense of perspective, which requires the
'integration of mixed experiences across time, is
impaired, leading to an unrealistic and at times
dramatic overreaction to the experience of the
moment. While these segregated affect states and
related images of the self and others are
accessible to consciousness at different moments,
with neither side of the ambivalence is present in
awareness at a given moment precludes the
realistic integration of experience.
(p. 23)
Thus, Marmar and Horowitz, as well as Melito and Mahler and
Kernberg, describe splitting as an affectively based,/
separation of internal representations or memories of self
and others.

While there has been much theorizing about splitting,
largely based on informal clinical observation of borderline
patients, there has been a dearth of empirical studies of
the phenomenon.

This is in large part due to the fact that

operationalizing an inferred unconscious process is quite
difficult.

In recent years, however, psychodynamic

theorists have attempted to remedy the problem by creating
measures based on either clinicians ratings of the presence
or absence of specific defenses, or self report measures of
what have been termed "conscious mental derivatives" of

these unconscious processes.

A defense scale has been

developed based on clinicians' ratings, The Defense
Mechanism Rating Scale (Perry & Cooper, 1986), but it
requires lengthy clinical interviews by trained clinicians
to administer and is thus often impractical for use in
screening subjects for research participation.

Two self-

report measures have been developed to specifically measure
splitting, the Splitting Scale (Gerson, 1984), and the Image
Distorting Defense subscale of the Defense Style
Questionnaire (Bond et al., 1983).

Neither of these has

been fully validated, however.

In order to clearly operationalize the concept of
splitting, one must first analyze the concept and determine
what splits, and on what basis.

There appears to be a

general agreement among theorists that first images or
"memory traces", and later internal representations of the
self and others are split along affective lines and that as
Marmar and Horowitz point out, when these individuals are in
one affective state, they have no access to contradictory
memories that might modulate their experiences.

If this is

the case, then shouldn't these individuals demonstrate this
mood congruent memory for information relating to themselves
or to significant others in the laboratory as well as in
real life?

Shouldn't they also demonstrate stronger mood

congruent memory effects for this type of information than
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individuals who do not utilize this defense mechanism?

Memory Research

Two general areas of memory research seem to be
particularly relevant to out understanding of splitting.
The first area of interest concerns the mnemonic effects of
self-referencing of information and the other area is
concerned with the effects of mood on memory.

Self-Referencing

It has been long noticed that people tend to learn new
information by relating it to themselves (e.g., the intern
syndrome in medical students or psychology graduate
students) (Bower & Gilligan, 1979).
this, however?

What is the purpose of

Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) and Bower

and Gilligan (1979) initiated experiments to compare the
memory enhancing properties of self-referencing of
adjectives with other forms of processing.

Rogers et al.,

utilizing an incidental recall paradigm, had subjects rate
adjectives on their structural, phonemic, semantic, or selfreferent qualities.

They found that memory for adjectives

that had been self-referred was far superior to adjectives
that had been rated on other dimensions and that although
yes rated items were recalled slightly better than no rated

items in the self-reference condition (yes or no ratings did
not make a difference in other conditions), just the act of
self-referencing created a strong mnemonic advantage.

Bower

and Gilligan, in two experiments, first compared recall of
trait adjectives that had been judged by subjects as
referring to themselves (either generally or by retrieving
specific life episodes) with recall for adjectives that had
been judged on the basis of their meaning or sound, and then
in a second experiment compared recall for adjectives that
had been judged in relation to the subjects' self, their
mothers, or a less familiar individual (Walter Cronkite).
In the first experiment, they found that subjects exhibited
superior memory for adjectives that had been self-referred
(either on a general basis or by utilizing specific
memories), and in the second experiment they found superior
memory when subjects related adjectives to either themselves
or their mother, but not when subjects applied them to the
less familiar individual (Walter Cronkite).

They also found

that yes items were recalled slightly better than no items,
but this effect did not reach significance.

In interpreting

their results, both of these sets of researchers noted that
the self schema is a complex and highly differentiated
cognitive concept and therefore enables subjects to
associate list words to a number of different cues.

Bower

demonstrated the fact that this extends to concepts of
significant others.

Rogers et al. define the self as "an

18

abstract representation of past experience with personal
data...A more formal definition of self is to view it as a
list of terms or features that have been derived from a
lifetime of experience" (p. 677).

They also noted that "in

order for self-reference to be such a useful encoding
process, the self must be a uniform, well-structured
concept" (p. 686).

Interpreted in this light, Bower's

finding that judging information in relation to their
mothers also produced powerful mnemonic effects in subjects,
is particularly interesting.

This agrees with notions of

psychodynamic theorists who suggest that we all have
internal representations of both ourselves and significant
others.

While in normal individuals, we would expect these

internal representations or self-schema to be relatively
stable and complex, in borderlines we would expect that
these self representations are less stable and are affect
bound.

That is, borderlines should demonstrate less

mnemonic advantage of self-referencing than others when
their mood at recall differs from that during the selfreferencing process.

Mood and Memory

Lets now turn our attention to the literature on mood and
memory.

In 1981, after a series of experiments in which

subjects' moods were varied by use of hypnotic mood

induction procedures and the effects of these moods on
memory and other cognitive processes were assessed, Bower
proposed a theory of mood and memory that would fit within
existing semantic network theories of long term memory such
as those described by Anderson and Bower (1973) and Collins
and Loftus (1975).

"In this theory an emotion serves as a

memory unit that can enter into associations with coincident
events.

Activation of this emotion unit aids retrieval of

events associated with it; it also primes emotional themata
for use in free association, fantasies, and perceptual
categorization."

(Bower, 1981, p. 129).

In 1984, Gilligan

and Bower elaborated on this theory, listing seven
postulates and four hypotheses that follow from those
postulates.

These hypotheses are: 1) STate Dependent Recall

- memory is superior when recall state matches learning
state; 2) Thought Congruity - thoughts, fantasies and
memories tend to be congruent with current mood state; 3)
Mood Congruity - material which is of a similar affective
tone to a subject's current mood state is learned best; and
4) Mood Intensity - learning is positively correlated with
the intensity of the subject's mood state (Gilligan and
Bower, 1984).

In terms of splitting, Bower's second

hypothesis, which he calls 'thought congruity', is most
salient as it directly addresses current mood state and it's
effect on availability of affectively congruent or noncongruent material.
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According to the Network Theory of Affect, recall
congruency (i.e., the thought congruity
hypothesis) occurs when an induced mood activates
particular emotion nodes that bias the person to
search memory for related material. This biased
search, as well as activation spreading from the
emotion node, results in increased availability of
mood congruent memories.
Individuals in
particular mood states should be more likely to
retrieve newly learned material and
autobiographical memories congruent with their
moods.
(Singer & Salovey, 1988, p. 217)
In his 1981 paper, Bower describes an experiment on 'snap
judgments' in which subjects were asked to give brief
personality sketches of familiar people in their lives after
either a positive or negative mood was induced.

He reports

that character descriptions were congruent with the
subjects' moods.

He states:

Assuming heterogeneous impressions have been stored
about familiar persons, we may suppose that current
mood causes retrieval of primarily positive or
primarily negative memories of a familiar person.
In
this way, the summary evaluation is thus biased by the
availability of the positive versus negative features
that come to mind.
(p. 140).

Evidence for recall or thought congruity in other studies
utilizing mood induction procedures has been mixed, although
generally supportive, with some authors reporting congruity
in both positive and negative moods, some reporting
congruity in positive moods only and some reporting no
congruity.

These studies have used a variety of Mood

Induction Procedures and a variety of dependent measures.
Common mood inductions utilized include, hypnosis, self

generated imagery and Velten (1968) mood statements.

Other

studies have used more subtle mood inductions such as music,
weather, the receipt of a free gift, or false success or
failure feedback.

Common dependent measures include number

of congruent versus non-congruent autobiographical memories
recalled, latency of recall of positive or negative
autobiographical memories, recall of positive and negative
aspects of stories, and recall of adjective lists, although
various other measures have also been utilized (Singer &
Salovey, 1988).

Madigan and Bollenbach (1982), using Velten mood
statements as mood inductions and autobiographical memories
as the dependent measure found congruency effects for both
positive and negative moods in three experiments.

Teasdale

and Russell (1981), Teasdale and Taylor (1981), and
Teasdale, Taylor, and Fogarty (1980), all using Velton mood
statements but using a variety of dependent measures, also
found congruency for both positive and negative moods, as
did Natale and Hantas (1982), using both hypnosis and Velten
statements and a variety of dependent measures, and Snyder
and White (1982), using Velten statements as a mood
induction and autobiographical memories as a dependent
measure.

Wright and Mischel (1982), using self generated

imagery and success or failure as mood inductions and self
appraisal and performance expectations as dependent measures
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also found congruency for both positive and negative moods.
An earlier study by Postman and Brown (1952), using success
and failure as a mood induction and recognition threshold
for positive and negative adjectives as a dependent measure,
also found this congruency effect.

On the other hand, Bower, Gilligan, and Montiero (1981) in
five experiments using hypnosis as a mood induction
procedure and recall of positive or negative aspects of
stories, failed to find the expected recall congruity
effect.

Gerrig and Bower (1982) also failed to find

congruency, using hypnosis as a mood induction and speed of
recognition of previously presented words as their dependent
measure.

Lack of congruity was also reported by Siegel,

Johnson, and Sarason (1979) usinig the Velten mood induction
technique and a life experience survey as a dependent
measure.

Bower and Mayer (1985) also failed to find this

effect, again using hypnosis, but this time utilizing a two
list interference recall paradigm.

These failures to

replicate his own earlier results led Bower (Bower & Mayer,
1985) to question whether his earlier mood/memory
formulation was too simplistic.

Isen et al. (1978) in two experiments in which the receipt
of a free gift and success or failure were used as mood
inductions, found congruency in ratings of consumer products

and recall of personality traits for positive moods only.
Mischel et a l . (1976), using success or failure as mood
inductions found similarly skewed results, as did Nasby and
Yando (1982) in one of two experiments using children as
subjects.

Two other studies, one by Riskind, Rholes, and

Eggers (1982), and one by Schwarz and Clore (1983) also
obtained somewhat asymmetrical results.

Singer and Salovey

(1988) have noted that in many of the studies in which
recall congruency in both positive and negative moods has
been found, this has been the result of increased or
decreased availability of positive material and has not
involved changes in availability of negative material at
all.

Both Isen (1978, 1985) and Singer and Salovey (1988)

have suggested that what may be missing in Bower's
mood/memory formulation is a motivational component.

These

authors suggest that people are motivated to maintain
pleasurable experiences and to minimize or end unpleasant
experiences.

Therefore it is to be expected that while

normal individuals may experience an automatic increase in
mood congruent associations while in a negative mood state,
they will attempt to counter this tendency by the use of
controlled processes (e.g., counting their blessings, etc.).
According to Isen et al. (1978), "Such persons may in fact
have more easy access to negative material in memory, just
as good-mood subjects have greater access to positive, but
they may actively try to counter this tendency while the
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latter have no reason to do so."

(p. 10).

Singer and

Salovey (1988) suggest, "Given time, and a certain amount of
higher order processing, more functional, negative mood
repairing mechanisms might take over, returning the organism
to its initial affective equilibrium" (p. 244).

They

suggest that one difference between the studies showing
congruency in negative mood states and those that don't show
this effect may be different time lags between mood
inductions and dependent measures.
salient to this author.

Two other factors appear

First, most of the studies that

found significant recall congruency effects used strict
subject selection criteria, only including subjects who
demonstrated strong responses to the mood induction
procedures.

Also, many of these studies used primarily

female subjects.

Clark and Teasdale (1985), after noticing

that female subjects tended to show stronger recall
congruency for adjectives than male subjects did, designed
two studies to test this directly and to look at possible
reasons for this difference.

They found that women did, in

fact, show stronger recall congruency than men, although
both sexes showed equivalent responses to the mood
inductions.

They ruled out the possibility that clustering

(remembering mood congruent words cues recall of other
congruent words) differed between the sexes.

What they

found in their second study was that usage ratings of
personality trait, words differed between the sexes, with
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mean female usage ratings significantly above mean male
ratings.

They also found that women recalled more mood

congruent than non-congruent high usage words but recalled
similar numbers of congruent and non-congruent low usage
words.

They interpret their findings within associative

network theories of mood and memory, noting that "the
observed sex difference in the effects of mood on recall of
pleasant and unpleasant words arises because activation of
concepts denoted by these words has occurred more often in
congruent mood states in the previous experience of women
than of men" (p. 1602).

They relate their findings to

previous research findings that depression is more prevalent
in women than in men, women are more likely than men to
become depressed, and women take longer to recover from
depression than men do, suggesting that women's enhanced
recall of congruent material while in negative mood states
might create a vicious cycle that would both lead to and
perpetuate depression.

This study is of particular interest

in relation to borderline personality for three reasons:
first, as noted previously, borderline personality disorder
is more often diagnosed in females than in males; second,
Dysthymia and Major Depression are often associated with
this diagnosis; and third, it would seem that due to the
instability of their moods, borderlines would have even more
previous experience with associating evaluative trait
concepts with mood states than would women generally.

26

So far we have only considered studies that used mood
induction procedures and normal subject populations.

What

sorts of results have been obtained in studies utilizing
naturally occurring moods?

These studies can be broken down

into two main categories; those that use mood fluctuations
in normal individuals, and those that use clinical
populations.

While the results using normal subjects have

again been mixed, those studies that used clinical
populations have generally provided stronger support for the
mood congruency hypothesis (Singer & Salovey, 1988).

For

example, Clark and Teasdale (1982) found that depressed
subjects generated more positive memories when they felt
better and more negative memories when they felt worse.
Mathews and Bradley (1983) found that more depressed
subjects recalled fewer positive and more negative trait
adjectives from a previously presented list.

Lloyd and

Lishman (1975) found that depressed subjects recalled more
intensely negative memories and that speed of recall of
positive associations was negatively correlated with degree
of depression on the Beck Depression Inventory.
Weingartner, Miller, and Murphy (1977), in a study of
hospitalized Bipolar patients, found that recall of
previously generated associations negatively correlated with
change in mood and that congruent associations were recalled
best.

In an interesting study in which they had subjects
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rate their liking of nonsense syllables, Slive et al. (1984)
found that depressed subjects recalled more disliked
nonsense syllables than non-depressed subjects.

Kuiper and

Derry (1982), compared recall congruency of previously self
referenced trait adjectives in individuals who scored higher
or lower on the Beck Depression Inventory.

They found

enhanced self-referent recall for non-depressed subjects for
non-depressed content, and enhanced self-referent recall for
depressed subjects for depressed content.

Rationale

Given all of the above evidence, it would seem likely that
borderline subjects would show mood congruency in recall of
previously self-referenced adjectives in both positive and
negative moods while normal individuals would show this
effect only in positive moods (or at least show weaker mood
congruency in negative moods).

Although demonstrating this

effect in a clinical population would have been ideal,
practical considerations precluded a study of that scope.
It was therefore hoped that by utilizing an analog paradigm,
in which subjects were classified on the basis of higher or
lower scores on measures designed to tap into
characteristics of individuals with this disorder, these
same effects would be demonstrated.

The study was designed to specifically look at elements of
cognition and memory that are theoretically related to the
splitting defense.

An incidental recall paradigm utilizing

self-referencing of trait adjectives as the orienting task
was chosen for a number of reasons.

First, personality

trait adjectives are thought to be closely tied to self
images or self schemas (e.g., Rogers et al.).

Also, the use

of this methodology allowed for two tests of the mood
congruency hypothesis, one involving judgments about the
self and one involving recall of information about the self.
It was thought that the use of this particular methodology
would provide information about the extent to which memory
processes were involved in subjects' self judgments and
therefore the splitting defense.

If the results differed

for the two tasks, it might suggest that processes other
than mood congruent memory were involved in this defense
mechanism.

An incidental rather than an intentional recall

paradigm was chosen to most closely resemble real life
memory processes.

Hypotheses

It was hypothesized that parallel results would be found
in the self-referencing and recall portions of the
experiment, with low scorers demonstrating mood congruency
of self-referencing and recall in positive moods, and high
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scorers demonstrating mood congruency of self-referencing
and recall for both positive and negative moods.
bias toward the positive was also expected.

A general

Chapter II
METHOD

Subjects

The subjects were
Montana, 72 of whom

161 students at the University of
were female, and 89

Their ages ranged from 18 to 48,
median of 21.

Most

with a

of whom were male.
mean of24 and a

of them were enrolled in an Introductory

Psychology course and participated in this study as a
partial fulfillment of the research participation
requirement of the class.

A few of them were students in

other psychology courses who volunteered their
participation.

The Introductory Psychology student subjects

were recruited by means of sign up sheets posted in the
psychology department, and the other subjects were recruited
by sign up sheets distributed in their classes.

Subjects

were classified into high or low scoring groups by utilizing
a median split procedure on scores on the personality
measures.

For the Introductory Psychology students, these

scores were obtained at general pre-screenings at the
beginning of the quarter, and for the other subjects these
scores were obtained individually prior to their
participation in the experimental portion of the study.

All

subjects were treated in accord with the "Ethical Principles
of Psychologists" (American Psychological Association,1981).
30
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Materials

Personality Measures

All subjects were administered the Borderline subscale of
the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-II (MCMI-II)
(Millon, 1987), the Splitting Scale (Gerson, 1984), and the
items forming the Image Distorting Defense subscale of the
Defense Style Questionnaire (DSQ) (Bond et al., 1983) during
the pre-screening at the beginning of the quarter (see
Appendixes A, B, and C ) .

The scaling of items from the

Image Distorting Subscale was changed from nine to seven
point Likert scales so that this scale could be combined
with the Splitting Scale.

(See Appendix D for combined

scale).

The Borderline subscale of the MCMI-II was selected as a
measure of the instability and affective lability associated
with Borderline Personality Disorder.

According to Millon

(1987), the MCMI-II represents a refinement of the MCMI-I,
and scores on the MCMI-II Borderline Scale correlate .79
with scores on the MCMI-I Cycloid Scale (n = 756).

For the

MCMI-II Borderline Scale, Millon reports a Kuder-Richardson
internal consistency coefficient of .92, and a test-retest
stability for non-clinical populations of .79 after an
interval of between three and five weeks.

Varimax Rotated

factor analysis revealed eight factors for the MCMI-II
generally; the Borderline Scale loads .63 on Factor One,
which is interpreted as representing general maladjustment,
.46 on Factor Two, which is interpreted as representing
acting out tendency, and .32 on Factor Eight which is
interpreted as representing interpersonal ambivalence,
internal conflict, and erratic emotionality.

Median Base

Rate scores on the Borderline Scale for two groups of
patients that had been previously diagnosed as suffering
from Borderline Personality Disorder were reported as 73 (n
= 60) and 79 (n = 99).

For clinical populations, Millon

claims a general predictive power of 90%.

Although high

correlations have been reported between this scale and a
number of the other clinical scales, Millon reports that
these are theoretically consistent.

He also reports,

however, that the presence of anxious or dysthymic states
can artificially inflate scores on the Borderline Scale.

The Splitting Scale and the Image Distorting Defense
Subscale of the DSQ were selected as measures of the
hypothesized defense mechanism of splitting.

Although they

have not been well validated, they are the only published
self-report scales that measure this elusive construct.
Because of their relative lack of demonstrated empirical
validity, they were not utilized to classify subjects for
the primary analysis, but it was hoped that some further
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validation for these scales could be obtained by their
inclusion in this study.

The items for the Splitting Scale were developed by Gerson
in consultation with psychotherapists who were candidates or
supervisors in a postdoctoral psychoanalytic training
program.

An attempt was made to create sentence stems that

would reflect Kernberg's and Kohut's conceptions of this
defense mechanism.

External criterion validation was

accomplished by correlating scores on this measure with
scores on the NArcissistic Personality Disorder MMPI Scale
developed by Ashby, Lee, and Duke (1979) and with the
Rosenberg (1965) Self Esteem Scale.

Data from 188 adults of

varying economic status and ethnic background was included
in this analysis.
were male.
found.

Of these subjects, 113 were female and 75

No significant sex or age differences were

The correlation of splitting scores with scores on

the Narcissistic Personality Disorder MMPI Scale was .25 (p
< .01), and there was a significant negative relationship
between scores on this scale and the Rosenberg Self Esteem
Scale (r = -.41, p < .001).

Gerson reports an item alpha

coefficient of .71 (n = 75) (internal consistency).

Test-

retest reliability analysis with a three week lag in
administrations yielded a product-moment correlation of .84
(p < .001).

Factor analysis of the scale revealed three

factors; a major splitting factor, a grandiosity factor, and
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a factor interpreted as representing splitting in intimate
relations.

The mean score on the scale was 52.973, with a

standard deviation of 11.464 and a range of 26 to 79 (out of
a possible 98).

Later cross validation of the scale by

Glassman (1986) revealed a comparable mean (55.02) and
standard deviation (9.82) and again no significant age or
sex differences.

However, his utilization of confirmatory

rather than exploratory factor analysis revealed a different
factor structure and suggested that three items of dubious
psychometric value (items 1, 7, and 9) do not in fact belong
on this scale.

Pilot work for this study confirmed

Glassman's finding that these three items do not correlate
highly with other scale items or with the total scale score.
Therefore, revised scale scores were utilized to classify
subjects for analyses involving this scale.

The Defense Style Questionnaire (Bond et al., 1983) was
designed to attempt to elicit "manifestations of a subject's
characteristic style of dealing with conflict, either
conscious or unconscious, based on the assumption that
persons can accurately comment on their behavior from a
distance" (p. 334).

In pilot research utilizing thirty

subjects, item-to-total correlations among items designed to
measure the same defense were calculated and only items that
correlated with their parent defense at a significance level
greater than .001-were retained.

Scores of 209 subjects
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(111 of whom were considered to be normal and functioning
well and 98 of whom were psychiatric patients) were then
correlated with two tests designed to measure ego
development, and item-to-total correlations for each defense
were again performed.

It was found that defense scores

correlated with the measures of ego development as they
theoretically should have.

Principal Component factor

analyses revealed four factors.

Factor Two (Image.

Distorting Defenses) consisted of items which apparently
measured splitting, omnipotence, and primitive idealization.
All three defenses loaded greater than .50 on this factor.
This factor had a significant positive correlation with the
factor thought to measure immature acting-out defenses and a
significant negative correlation with the factor thought to
be measuring mature healthy defenses.

In a later validation

study (Bond et al., 1989) scores on the DSQ were correlated
with scores on the Defense Mechanism Rating Scale (DMRS)
(Perry & Cooper, 1986), a scale that utilizes clinicians
ratings of defense mechanisms; the Life Events Scale, a
checklist questionnaire regarding life events; and the
Health-Sickness Rating Scale.

Complete data were obtained

for 156 patients, 130 outpatients and 26 inpatients.

In

this study, scores on the Image Distorting Defense subscale
significantly correlated with the DMRS immature defenses,
with high Life Events Scale Scores and negatively correlated
with age.

However, of the twelve items that loaded on the
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DSQ image-distorting factor in the previous study, only five
correlated with the DMRS image distorting defenses and also
with the DMRS immature defenses.

Mood Inductions

The mood induction procedure chosen for the first part of
the study (self-referencing) was the use of music.

As in

the Clark and Teasdale (1985) study, subjects listened
either to a passage from "Coppelia" by Delibes (positive
condition), or to "Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke" by
Prokofiev recorded at half speed (negative condition).

In

order to minimize demand characteristics, listening to the
music was presented as one of the experimental tasks (see
Appendix F for specific subject instructions).

The music

was played on a tape recorder that was hooked into a public
address system in the research room.

Each passage was seven

minutes in duration.

The mood induction procedure chosen for the second part of
the experiment was a modified version of the Velton Mood
Induction Procedure (1968), similar to that used by Teasdale
and Russell (1983).

Subjects were asked to read booklets

containing one statement on each page and to try to get into
the feelings expressed by each statement (see Appendix F for
mood statements and Appendix E for specific instructions).
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This lasted for seven minutes.

Manipulation Checks

For the first part of the study, the manipulation check
was a three item questionnaire that asked subjects to rate
the emotional tone of the music, their involvement in the
music and their mood by means of seven point Likert scales
(see Appendix G for complete subject packets).

For the

second part of the study subjects' moods were assessed by
means of a seven point Likert scale, with anchors of very
happy, neither happy nor unhappy, and very unhappy (again,
see Appendix G ) .

Stimulus Material

The stimulus material consisted of individual slides of 54
personality trait adjectives (in white, with blue
backgrounds) that were presented on a screen at the front of
the room for eight seconds each.

The adjectives were

selected from the list of 555 trait adjectives rated for
likableness and published by Anderson (1968).

One half of

the adjectives were selected from the upper third of norms
(likeable) and one half were from the lower third of norms
(unlikable).

An attempt was made

to choose words that had

low standard deviations, comparable meaningfulness ratings,
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comparable rankings, and different meanings.

Except for the

first and last six adjectives presented to the subjects,
which were balanced for likableness, the order of
presentation was determined randomly (see Appendix I for
word list).

Procedure

When the subjects arrived at the research room, they were
told that the study that they were participating in was
concerned with various cognitive processes and that their
mood would be assessed after each task.

At each desk was a

packet with all of the rating scales and other measures in
the order in which they were to be utilized (with black
sheets between each segment of the experiment).

Specific

subject instructions are contained in Appendix F, and a
sample packet is contained in Appendix H.

After filling out the face sheets, the subjects were asked
to listen to some music (mood induction one).

They were

told "please try to really get into it as we will be asking
you some questions about your experience of it afterwards".
After listening to the music, they were asked to answer the
three questions asking them to rate their experience
(manipulation check one).

They were then told that next a

number of adjectives would be presented to them on the
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screen at the front of the room and were asked to rate
whether each one applied to them as it was presented.

The

fifty four adjectives were then presented to the subjects
and they circled yes or no for each one to indicate whether
it applied to them or not.

This represented the self-

referencing portion of the experiment.

Next, as a distraction, the subjects were asked to work on
some arithmetic problems.

At the end of eight minutes they

were told to stop working and again asked to rate their
mood.

Neither the arithmetic problems nor the mood ratings

were actually scored as part of the experiment.

Subjects were next asked to read through booklets
containing one statement per page that they would find near
their seats, and to try to get into the feelings described
by each statement.

They were told to continue reading the

statements until they were asked to stop (mood induction
two).

After seven minutes they were asked to stop and to

rate their moods (manipulation check two).

They were then

asked to write down as many of the adjectives from the blue
slides as they could remember, in any order that they
remembered them.
experiment.

This represented the recall portion of the

Chapter III
RESULTS
Descriptive Data
Scores on Personality Measures

Scores on the MCMI-II Borderline Scale ranged form 0 to
76, with a mean of 22.23, a median of 19, and a standard
deviation of 16.04.

There were no sex differences found on

scale scores (two tailed t (155) = -.38, p =.71), and no
differences in scores for the subjects in the two mood
conditions (two tailed t (156) = -.81, p =.42).

Scores on the Splitting Scale-Revised ranged from 20 to
64, with a mean of 42.9, a median of 43 and a standard
deviation of 9.16.

There were no sex differences found on

scale scores (two tailed t (155) = .54, p =.59), and no
differences in scores for the subjects in the two mood
conditions (two tailed t (155) = -1.48, p =.14).
Scores on the Image Distorting Subscale of the DSQ ranged
from 12 to 65, with a mean of 33.6, a median of 33 and a
standard deviation of 10.46.

Significant sex differences

were found on scale scores (two tailed t (156) = -5.56, p.
<.0001).

Males scored higher on this scale than did females

(M MALES = 37.3, M FEMALES = 28.9).

However, no differences

in scores were found for subjects in the two mood conditions
(two tailed t (155) = -.85, p =.40).
40
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Correlations between Personality Measures

For the subjects who participated in this study, Pearson
product moment correlations were calculated between scores
on the three personality measures.

These all reached

significance; the highest was between the MCMI-II Borderline
Scale and the Splitting Scale-Revised (r = .568, p <.01,
percent of variance accounted for =.32), the second highest
was between the Splitting Scale-Revised and the Image
Distorting subscale of the DSQ (r = .455, p <.01, percent of
variance accounted for =.21), and the lowest was between the
Image Distorting Subscale of the DSQ and the MCMI-II
Borderline Scale (r = .262, p <.01, percent of variance
accounted for =.07).

Because it was more fully validated, the experimental data
was first analyzed using the MCMI-II Borderline Scale as the
personality classification variable.

However, scores on

this measure were not normally distributed.

For this reason

and also to determine whether higher scorers on the two
measures would behave in a similar manner, the data was then
reanalyzed using the revised Splitting Scale as the
personality classification variable.

Because of the

significant sex differences found on the Image Distorting
Defense subscale, and also because of its weaker
relationship with the other two personality measures,
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results were not analyzed utilizing this scale.

It should

also be noted that although pilot work had revealed sex
differences in scores on the Revised Splitting Scale and
heteroscedasticity in the relationship between the MCMI-II
Borderline scores and the Revised Splitting Scale scores
(see appendix E), for the experimental subjects the
relationship between these measures was found to be
homoscedastic.

Personality Measure Scores for High and Low Scoring Groups

Table One presents the descriptive statistics for the high
and low scoring groups after the median split procedure was
utilized to classify subjects.

Table One
MCMI-II BPD
Low Scorers
Range
Mean
Median
SD
High Scorers
Range
Mean
Median
SD

Splitting Scale (rev

0 to 18
9.5
10
4.9

20 to 42
35
37
5.7

20 to 76
35
30
13

44 to 64
49
50
5.4
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Experiment - Part One - Self-Referencing
Manipulation Checks - First Mood Induction

All of the manipulation checks were first analyzed
utilizing scores on the MCMI-II Borderline Scale (BPD Scale)
as the personality classification variable and then re
analyzed utilizing scores on the revised Splitting Scale as
the personality classification variable.

All of the analyses utilized a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial general
linear model unbalanced analysis of variance (anova), with
the first factor representing the mood condition (positive
or negative), the second factor representing the personality
factor (higher or lower scorers), and the third factor
representing the sex of the subjects (male or female).

Analysis of Mood Ratings fMCMI-II BPD Scaled

This analysis revealed a significant main effect of
condition, F (1,148) = 27.16, p <.001, MSe = 1.088, a
significant main effect of sex, F (1,148) = 9.5, p<.002, MSe
= 1.088, and a trend toward a two way interaction between
the condition and personality factors, F (1,148) = 3.17,
p<.10, MSe = 1.088, on subjects' ratings of their moods.
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Generally, subjects, regardless of personality or sex,
rated their mood as more positive in the positive condition
than in the negative condition (M POS = 3.245, M NEG =
4.131).

Males generally rated their mood as more positive than did
females regardless of condition (M MALES = 3.426, M FEMALES
= 3.950).

Although not reaching significance, there was a trend for
lower scorers on the MCMI-II BPD Scale (LBs) to rate their
mOod as more positive in the positive mood condition than
higher scorers on the MCMI-II BPD Scale (HBs) (S* LBs =
3.085, M HBs = 3.405) and to rate their mood as more
negative in the negative mood condition than high scorers (M
LBs = 4.274, M HBs = 3.989).

The reason for this is not

clear as no pre-induction mood ratings were obtained.
However, the lack of significant differences between the
mood ratings of high and low scorers in the non-induced
moods suggests that these subjects may have responded
differently to the mood induction procedure or may have had
a different perceptual set regarding mood intensity.

Analysis of Mood Ratings (revised Splitting Scale)

This analysis revealed a significant main effect of
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condition, F (1,139) = 22.57, p<.001, MSe = 1.108, a
significant main effect of sex, F (1,139) = 2.96, pc.10, MSe
= 1.108, on subjects' ratings of their moods.

As in the analysis that used MCMI-II BPD scores as the
personality classification variable, subjects generally
rated their moods as more positive in the positive mood
condition than in the negative mood condition (M Positive =
3.259, M Negative = 4.102).

Also consistent with the analysis using MCMI-II BPD scores
to classify subjects was the finding that males generally
rated their mood as more positive than did females (M Males
= 3.40, M Females = 3.96) regardless of condition.

Inconsistent with the previous analysis, however, was the
lack of a finding of a trend toward a condition by
personality interaction and the finding instead of a trend
toward a condition by sex interaction.

This interaction

(although not reaching significance) resulted from the fact
that while the males' and females' mood ratings were not
that different in the positive mood condition (M Males =
3.13, H Females = 3.39), they were more different in the
negative mood condition (M Males = 3.67, M Females = 4.54).
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Ratings of Emotional Tone of Music (MCMI-II BPD Scale 1

There was a significant main effect for condition, F
(1,148) =380.80, pc.001, MSe = 1.124, a significant (but
uninterpretable) main effect for sex, F (1,148) = 3.94,
p<.05, MSe = 1.124, on ratings of the emotional tone of the
music.

Generally, all subjects, regardless of personality or sex,
rated the positive condition music as more happy than the
negative condition music (M POS = 2.285, M NEG = 5.659).

In the positive mood condition, LB Males and HB Females
rated the music as most happy (M LBMs = 2.0, M HBFs =
2.143), while HB Males and LB Females rated the music as
least happy (M HBMs = 2.476, M LBFs = 2.522).

In the

negative mood condition, LB and HB Females rated the music
as most unhappy (M LBFs = 5.929,

M HBFs =

6.053),LB Males

rated the music as somewhat less unhappy (M LBMs = 5.524),
and the HB Males rated the music as least unhappy

(M HBMs =

5.130).

of the

This is interesting, in that the ratings

happiness of the music by HB Females contrast with their
mood ratings.

While their ratings of the emotional tone of

the music are more extreme than those of the low scoring
Females, their ratings of their moods tend to be more
neutral.
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Ratings of Emotional Tone of Music (revised Splitting Scaled

This analysis revealed a significant main effect for
condition, F (1,139) = 336.60, pc.001, MSe = 1.156, and a
significant main effect of sex, F (1,139) = 4 . 7 2 , p<-05, MSe
= 1.156, on ratings of the emotional tone of the music.

Generally, subjects in the positive mood condition rated
the music as more happy than subjects in the negative mood
condition (M positive = 2.30, M negative = 5.63).

Males generally rated the music as more happy than did
Females regardless of condition (M Males = 3.77, M Females =
4.16).

This analysis contrasts with the analysis in which the
MCMI-II BPD Scale was used to classify subjects, in that in
this analysis the personality factor did not interact with
the condition and sex factors.

Ratings of Involvement in Music

No significant effects were found for the condition,
personality, or sex factors on subjects' ratings of their
involvement in the music when using either the MCMI-II BPD
Scale or the revised Splitting Scale to classify subjects.
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Self-Referencing Analyses and Results

The self-referencing data was first analyzed utilizing
scores on the MCMI-II Borderline Scale as the personality
classification variable and then was reanalyzed using scores
on the revised Splitting Scale to classify subjects.

The

data was then analyzed separately for each sex, again using
scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale as the personality
classification variable.

Each of these analyses utilized a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2

unbalanced

analysis of variance (anova) with three between subjects
factors (mood condition, personality classification, and
sex) and one within subjects repeated measure factor
(congruent vs non-congruent adjectives).

For each analysis

the dependent measure was the number of adjectives rated as
applying to the self.

Table Two contains the significant F ratios for effects
involving the congruence factor that were obtained in each
analysis.

In general, the results were similar when using

the MCMI-II BPD scores and the Splitting Scale scores as the
personality classification variable.

Analyzing the data for

each sex separately revealed a different pattern of results
for males and females, however, although this was not
apparent in the combined analyses.
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Table 2 (Self-Referencing)
F Ratios For Effects Involving Congruence Factor
Factors

BPD

COND X CONG

409.16

Splitting

■kick

COND X PERS X CONG

9.52
**

Females

Males

388.89
***

152.48
***

274.54

3.72
*

6.44
**

3.00
(t)

k k k

*** = pc.001, ** = pc.Ol, * = p < .05, (t) = .05 < p < .10

The hypothesized condition by congruence interaction was
found in all analyses, indicating the general bias towards
positivity in self-referencing.

The hypothesized three way

interaction between the condition, personality, and
congruence factors was also found, although this interaction
was not in the form expected.

In addition, this interaction

differed in males and females.

Several other significant results were found that did not
involve the congruence factor.

For these analyses the

dependent variable was the mean number of adjectives selfreferenced (collapsing over the congruence factor).

The F

ratios for these effects that were significant or that
approached significance in each analysis are presented in
Table Three.
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Table 3 (Self-Referencing)
F Ratios For Effects Involving Between Subjects Factors

Factors

MCMI-II
Score

PERS

4.75*

SEX

3.74*

Splitting
Score
3.01 (t)

Females
Only

Males
Only

3.30 (t)
NA

NA

6.53**

C X P
P X S

3.22 (t)
3.26 (t)

CXPXS

NA

NA

NA

NA

** = pc.Ol, * = p < .05, (t) = .05 < p < .10

As can be seen in Table three, the patterns of results are
somewhat different for each analysis.

Results differ when

utilizing the MCMI-II BPD Scale or the Splitting scale s the
personality classification variable.

In addition, a

different pattern of results is obtained for males and
females.

Analysis of Data For All Subjects - Using MCMI-II BPD Scale

For this analysis, there were 156 subjects with usable
data of whom 70 were female and 86 were male.

Analysis of the self-referencing data revealed a
significant condition by congruence effect, F (1,148) =
409.16, pc.001, MSe = 28.4, and a significant condition by
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personality by congruence effect, F (1 *1 4 8 ) = 9.52, p<.002,
MSe = 28.4.

Figure One graphically represents the condition by
congruence interaction.

As can be seen in this figure, in

the positive mood condition, subjects rated more congruent
that non-congruent adjectives as applying to themselves (M
CONG = 24.73, M NCONG = 12.805), and in the negative mood
condition this effect was reversed (H CONG = 11.963, M NCONG
= 24.894).

Or to state it another way, subjects generally

rated more positive than negative adjectives as applying to
themselves, regardless of mood condition.

Figure 1
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Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the three way
interaction between the condition, personality, and
congruence factors.

As can be seen in this figure, the

significant three way interaction results from the fact that
although there is not a significant difference between the
number of congruent (positive) adjectives or non-congruent
(negative) adjectives that HB and LB subjects rate as
applying to themselves in the positive mood condition or the
number of non-congruent (positive) adjectives that the two
groups rate as applying to themselves in the negative mood
condition, HBs rate significantly more congruent (negative)
adjectives as applying to themselves than do LBs in the
negative mood condition.

Figure 2
Condition x Congruence x Personality
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Although not of primary interest, several other
significant effects were observed.

These were a significant

main effect of personality, F (1,148) = 4.75, p<.05, MSe =
40.90, a significant

main effect of sex, F (1,148) =3.74,

p < .05, MSe = 40.90, and a trend toward a three way
interaction between the condition, personality, and sex
factors, F (1,148) = 3.26, pc.10, MSe = 40.90, on the mean
number of adjectives

rated as applying to the self

(collapsing over congruence factor).

Figure 3 is a

graphical representation of these results.

Figure 3
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Higher scorers generally rated more adjectives as applying
to themselves than did lower scorers, and females rated more
adjectives as applying to themselves than did males.

However, interpretation of these findings must be tempered
by the trend toward a three way interaction between the
condition, personality, and sex factors.

As can be seen in

Figure 3, female higher scorers rated more adjectives as
applying to themselves than did other subjects regardless of
condition.

Females (both higher and lower scorers) rated

similar numbers of adjectives as applying to themselves in
the two mood conditions, as did males who were higher
scorers.

However, males who were lower scorers rated more

adjectives as applying to themselves in the positive
condition than in the negative condition.

Analysis of Data For All Subjects -Utilizing Splitting Scale

For this analysis, there were 147 subjects with usable
data, 67 of whom were female and 80 of whom were male.

In

other respects, this analysis was identical to the previous
one.

Analysis of this data utilizing Splitting Scale scores as
the personality classification variable reveals a similar
pattern of significant results as was obtained using MCMI-II
Borderline Scores.

A significant condition by congruence

effect, F (1,139) = 388.89, p<.001, MSe = 29.39, and a
marginally significant condition by personality by
congruence effect, F (1,139) = 3.72, p = .056, MSe = 29.39,
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were found.
Figure 4 is a graphical representation of these results.
As can be seen in this figure, higher and lower scorers
rated the same number of congruent (positive) adjectives as
applying to themselves in the positive mood condition, and
the same number of non-congruent (positive) adjectives as
applying to themselves in the negative mood condition.
However, higher scorers rated more non-congruent adjectives
as applying to themselves in the positive mood condition
than did lower scorers, and also more congruent adjectives
as applying to themselves in the negative mood condition.
Also, while higher scorers rated about the same number of
adjectives as applying to themselves in both conditions,
lower scorers rated less negative adjectives as applying to

Figure 4
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In addition, there were non-significant trends toward a
main effect of personality, F (1,139) = 3.01, p<.l0, MSe =
42.45, and toward a two way interaction between the
personality and sex factors, F (1,139) = 3.22, p<.10, MSe =
42.45, on the mean number of adjectives rated as applying to
the self (collapsed over the congruence factor).

Figure 5

is a graphical representation of these results.

Figure 5
Personality x Sex Interaction
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As can be seen in Figure 5, higher scoring females rated
more adjectives as applying to themselves than did other
subjects, who rated approximately equal numbers of
adjectives as applying to themselves.
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Sex Differences in Self-Referencing by MCMI-II BPD Scores

The same three way interactions between the condition,
personality, and congruence factors were found when
analyzing the data for males and females separately.
However, these interactions were somewhat different for the
two sexes.

Generally, higher scoring females rated more

negative adjectives as applying to themselves in both mood
conditions than did lower scoring females.

On the other

hand, higher scoring males rated more negative adjectives as
applying to themselves than did lower scoring males in the
negative mood condition only.

Females Only

Analysis of the females' self-referencing data revealed a
significant condition by congruence interaction, F (1,66) =
152.48, pc.001, MSe = 30.64, and a significant condition by
personality by congruence interaction, F (1,66) = 6.44,
pc.Ol, MSe = 30.64.

As can be seen in Figure 6, these results are slightly
different from those obtained when including male subjects.
HB and LB females do not differ in the number of congruent
(positive) adjectives that they rate as applying to
themselves in the positive condition, or in the number of
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non-congruent (positive) adjectives that they rate as
applying to themselves in the negative condition.

However,

HB females rate more non-congruent (negative) adjectives as
applying to themselves in the positive condition and more
congruent (negative) adjectives as applying to themselves in
the negative condition than do LB females.

Or to put it

another way, higher scorers rated more negative adjectives
as applying to themselves than did lower scorers, regardless
of mood condition.

Figure 6
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There was also a trend toward a main effect for
personality, F (1,66) = 3.3, pc.10, MSe = 42.18, on the mean
number of adjectives rated as applying to the self
(collapsing over the congruence factor), although this
effect did not reach significance.

Generally, high scoring

females rated more adjectives as applying to themselves than
did low scoring females (M HBF = 22.83, M LBF = 18.29).

Males Ohlv

Analysis of the males' self-referencing data revealed a
significant condition by congruence interaction, F (1,82) =
274.54, pc.001, MSe = 26.6, and a trend toward a condition
by personality by congruence interaction, F (1,82) = 3.0,
p<.10, MSe = 26.6.

Figure 7 is a graphical representation of these results.
As can be seen in this figure, these results differ from
those of the females in that while HB males rate more
congruent (negative) adjectives as applying to themselves in
the negative condition than do LB males, the LB and HB males
do not differ in the number of non-congruent (negative)
adjectives that they rate as applying to themselves in the
positive condition.
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Figure 7
Condition x Personality x Congruence
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Analysis of the males' ratings also revealed a significant
condition by personality interaction, F (1,82) = 6.53, p =
.10, MSe = 39.86, on the mean number of adjectives rated as
applying to the self (collapsed over the congruence factor).

Figure 8 is a graphical representation of this
interaction.

As can be seen in this figure, males who were

low scorers rated more adjectives as applying to themselves
in the positive mood condition than in the negative mood
condition, while for males who were high scorers this
pattern was reversed.
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Figure 8
Condition x Personality Interaction
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Self-Referencing Results Summary

The results of the self-referencing analyses do not
generally support a mood congruency hypothesis in judgments
about the self.

Instead, a bias toward positivity in self-

referencing was generally found, although this was stronger
for low scorers than for high scorers on the two personality
measures.

In addition, high scoring females differed from

high scoring males in that the high scoring females rated
more negative adjectives as applying to themselves than did
low scoring females regardless of mood condition, while high
scoring males rated more negative adjectives as applying to
themselves than did low scoring males in the negative mood
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condition only.

Considered in isolation, the results for males could
conceivably provide some support for personality differences
in mood congruency of self-referencing.

However, this is

complicated by the results for females, which suggest a
lessening of positive bias in high scorers rather than mood
congruency per se, since female high scorers rated equal
numbers of negative adjectives as applying to themselves
regardless of their mood.

This suggests that high scoring

males and females may differ in some important aspects.

Experiment - Part Two - Recall

Manipulation Check - Second Mood Induction

Mood ratings were analyzed first using the MCMI-II BPD
Scale as the personality classification variable and then
re-analyzed using revised Splitting Scale scores to classify
subjects.

Both analyses utilized a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial general
linear model unbalanced analysis of variance (anova).

The

first factor represented the mood condition, the second
factor represented the personality classification and the
third factor represented the sex of the subject.
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Analysis of the mood ratings with the MCMI-II BPD Scale as
the personality classification variable revealed a
significant effect of condition, F (1,148) = 51.1, p<.001,
MSe = 1.869, and no significant effects of the personality
or sex factors.

Subjects rated their moods as most positive

in the positive mood condition (M = 3.155, SD = .16) and
most negative in the negative mood condition (M = 4.748, SD
= .16).

Analysis of the mood ratings with the revised Splitting
Scale as the personality classification variable revealed a
significant main effect of condition, F (1,139) = 56.84,
p < .001, MSe = 1.701, and a significant two way interaction
between the condition and personality factors, F (1,139) =
5.46, p < .05, MSe = 1.701.

Although all subjects generally

rated their moods as more positive in the positive mood
condition than in the negative mood condition, higher
scorers rated their moods as more positive in the positive
mood condition than did lower scorers (Ji HS = 2.65, M LS =
3.49), and slightly more negative in the negative mood
condition (H HS = 4.82, £| LS = 4.64).

Recall Analyses and Results

For the recall data, analyses utilizing four separate
dependent measures were conducted.

The congruency of

subjects' intrusions was analyzed first.

An analysis was

then conducted combining the recalled list items and the
subjects' intrusions to form the dependent measure.

Recall

of the adjectives that were actually presented to the
subjects was analyzed, and then another analysis was
conducted excluding the first and last six adjectives that
were presented to the subjects.

As with the self-referencing data, the recall data was
first analyzed using MCMI-II BPD Scale scores to classify
subjects, and was then re-analyzed utilizing the revised
Splitting Scale scores as the personality classification
variable.
sex.

Separate analyses were also performed for each

The only exception to this is the intrusion data,

which was not re-analyzed because no significant sex or
personality differences were found involving the congruence
factor.

Each of these analyses utilized a four factor unbalanced
analysis of variance, with three between subjects factors
(mood condition, personality classification, and sex) and
one within subjects repeated measure factor (congruent vs
non-congruent adjectives).

Each of these factors has two

levels.

The results of these analyses are summarized in Tables
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Four and Five.

Table Four presents the F ratios for effects

involving the congruence factor that approached or reached
significance.

As this table illustrates, the results of

these analyses are less clear cut than the results of the
self-referencing analyses.

Generally, the hypothesized

condition by congruence interaction is found, indicating a
bias toward positivity in recall.

However, the hypothesized

three way interaction between the condition, personality,
and congruence factors is found in some analyses but not in
others, and again this interaction is not in the form
expected.

Also, the only real evidence for mood congruence

is found in the analysis of subjects' intrusions, and no
personality differences involving the congruency factor are
found in this analysis.

One interesting finding is that

when we exclude the first and last six adjectives presented
to the subjects from our analysis, almost all interactions
involving the congruence factor disappear, and the one
effect that remains does not reach significance.
Table Four (Recall)
F Ratios For Effects Involving Congruence Factor

Intrusions
BPD
Cong (C)

46. IS
***

COHDxC

63.36
***

CxPxC
CxPxCXS

BPD

Rftcall + I
Sp
F

BPD

M

Recall
Sp
F

Excluding
B PD
Sp
F

M

M
3.0
(t)

3S.S6 41.67 11.65 27.68
***
***
***
***
S . 11
*

5.61 7.36
*
**

3.99
*
NX

2.83
(t)
HA

2.92
(t)

5.91
*

2.94
<t)

2.79
<t>
HA

HA

MX

*** «. p< .OOl ^ ** *• p<.OX, * - p<.05, (t) * p<-10

Inspection of Table Four reveals that the three way

MX
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condition by personality by congruence interaction was only
found when analyzing the data for women separately or when
the data was analyzed utilizing the Splitting Scale as the
personality classification variable.

Also, this effect only

reached significance when intrusions were combined with
actually recalled items to form the dependent variable.

Table Five contains the F ratios for each of the analyses
that did not include the congruence factor and that were
significant or approached significance.

Table Five (Recall)
F Ratios For Effects Involving
Between Subjects Factors

Intrusions
BPD
Condi

BPD

sp

F

M

BPD

4.23
*

3.03
(t>

Pers

4.36
*

Sex

12.73 10.1
***
**

CXP

HA

HA

3.26
(t)

HA

HA

PxS

3.76
(t)

HA

HA

7. 95
**

NA

HA

6.15
**

F

M

BPD

Sp

F

M

2.9

14.37 12.5
***
***

17.6
***

HA

HA

9.15
**

15.27 3.23
***
<t)

Cxs

CxPxS

Sp

2.8
<t>

7.23
**

3.22
<*)

10.19
**

13.65 12.32
***
***

HA

3.76
<t)

HA

HA

HA

HA

8.32
**

(t) -

0 5 < p < .LO

*** - p<. 001, ** « pc.oi, * - p< os.

3.12
(t.)

NA

8.77
**

3,01
(t)

3.26 H A
<t)

HA

2.81
<t)

HA

HA

HA

HA

HA

HA

As Table Five indicates, a more consistent pattern of
results is found for effects not involving the congruence
factor.

In all but one of the analyses combining subjects

of both sexes, significant condition by personality by sex
interactions were found on the mean number of adjectives
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recalled (collapsed over congruence).

Significant

interactions were also found between the condition and
personality factors in all of the analyses utilizing female
subjects.

However, the only effects found in the analyses

for male subjects are when intrusions are included with
recall.

In this analysis, a significant main effect for

personality was found as was a non-significant trend toward
an interaction between the condition and personality
factors.

The results for these analyses will described in

more detail.

Intrusions

There were 156 subjects with usable data for this
analysis, 70 of whom were female and 86 of whom were male.
The MCMI-II BPD Scale was used as the personality
classification variable.

This analysis revealed a significant main effect for
congruence, F (1,148) = 146.15, pc.001, MSe = 2.63, as well
as a significant two way interaction between the condition
and congruence factors, F (1,148) = 63.36, p<.00l, MSe =
2.63.

Figure 9 is a graphical representation of these

results.
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Figure 9
Condition x Congruence Interaction
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As can be seen in this figure, subjects in both conditions
had more congruent than non-congruent intrusions, although
this effect was much greater in the positive mood condition
than in the negative mood condition.

A significant main effect of condition, F (1,148) = 7.23,
pc.Ol, MSe - 3.79, and a significant three way interaction
between the condition, personality, and sex factors, F
(1,148) = 6.15, p < .05, MSe = 3.79, on the mean number of
intrusions (collapsed over the congruence factor) were also
observed.
results.

Figure 10 is a graphical representation of these
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Figure 10
Condition x Personality x Sex
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As can be seen in this figure, in the positive mood
condition HB females had the most intrusions and LB females
had the least, while in the negative mood condition LB
females and HB males had the most intrusions, HB females had
slightly less intrusions, and LB males had the least.

Recall Plus Intrusions

The results of the analyses of recall with intrusions
(including both female and male subjects) differ when
utilizing the MCMI-II BPD Scale or the Splitting Scale as
the personality classification variable.

When using the

MCMI-II BPD Scale, only the condition by congruence
interaction was significant, but when using the Splitting

70

Scale both this interaction and the Condition by Personality
by Congruence interactions were significant.

Analyses of

this data for each sex separately (again using the MCMI-II
BPD Scale to classify subjects) revealed different patterns
of results for the two sexes.

Females who were classified

on the basis of their scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale had a
similar pattern of results as subjects who were classified
on the basis of their Splitting Scale scores, while male
subjects showed only the Condition by Congruence effect, as
did the combined sample when classified on the basis of
their scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale.

Recall Plus Intrusions - Utilizing MCMI-II Borderline Scale

Analysis of this data revealed a significant condition by
congruence effect, F (1,148) = 36.56, pc.001, MSe = 7.87,
and no other significant effects involving the congruence
factor.

Figure 11 is a graphical representation of these

results.
As can be seen in Figure 11, subjects recalled (and
misrecalled ) more congruent adjectives when in the positive
mood condition and more non-congruent adjectives while in
the negative mood condition.
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Figure 11
Condition x Congruence Interaction
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There was also a significant main effect for personality,
F (1,148) = 4.36, p < .05, MSe = 13.87, a significant main
effect for sex, F (1,148) = 12.73, p<-001, MSe = 13.87, and
a three way interaction between the condition, personality,
and sex factors, F (1,148) = 17.61, pc.001, MSe = 13.87 on
the mean number of adjectives recalled (collapsed over the
congruence factor).
results.

Figure 12 graphically represents these
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Figure 12
Condition x Personality x Sex
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As can be seen in Figure 12, HB females recalled the most
adjectives in the positive mood condition, while HB males
recalled the most adjectives in the negative mood condition.
On the other hand, LB females recalled the most adjectives
in the negative mood condition, while LB males recalled
about the same number in each condition.

Recall Plus Intrusions - Utilizing Revised Splitting Scale

Utilizing the Revised Splitting Scale as the personality
classification variable, a significant condition by
congruence interaction was obtained, F (1,139) = 41.67,
p < .001, MSe = 7.69, as was a significant condition by
personality by congruence interaction, F (1,139) = 5.11,
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p < .05, MSe = 7.69.

Figure 13 is a graphical representation

of these results.

Figure 13
Condition x Personality x Congruence
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As can be seen in Figure 13, low scorers on the splitting
scale recalled about the same number of congruent adjectives
as high scorers did in both the positive and negative mood
conditions.

However, while high scorers recalled more non-

congruent adjectives than low scorers did in the positive
mood condition, in the negative mood condition this pattern
was reversed.

In this analysis, two other significant effects were
observed.

There was a significant main effect of sex, F

(1,139) = 10.10, pc.01, MSe = 15.24, and a significant three
way interaction between the condition, personality, and sex
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factors, F (1,139) = 7.95, pc.Ol, MSe = 15.24, on the mean
number of adjectives recalled (collapsing over the
congruence factor).

Figure 14 graphically represents these

results.

Figure 14
Condition x Personality x Sex
T3

10

12
11.5*

o
«
11
M
O 10.54)
a
10
■p
o
«
•n
■O

-

-

0
1----

I

negative.

positive

Mood Condition
— ■ — LS Females — +—

LS Males

—

HS Females

-Ea— HS Males

Females only

Analyzing the data for females separately reveals the same
significant condition by congruence interaction, F (1,66) =
11.65, p > .001, MSe = 7.43, as was found for all subjects.
However, a significant three way interaction was also found
between the condition, personality, and congruence factors,
F (1,66) = 3.99, p < .05, MSe = 7.43.
As can be seen in Figure 15, HB females recalled (and

75

misrecalled) similar numbers of congruent and non-congruent
adjectives in both the positive and the negative mood
conditions, although they recalled more of both kinds in the
positive mood condition.

LB females, however, recalled (and

misrecalled) significantly more congruent than non-congruent
adjectives in the positive mood condition, and significantly
more non-congruent than congruent adjectives in the negative
mood condition.

Figure 15
Condition x Personality x Congruence
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Figure 16
Condition x Personality Interaction
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As can be seen in Figure 16, there was also a significant
condition by personality interaction, F (1,66) = 15.27,
p < .001, MSe = 15.02, on mean number of adjectives recalled
(collapsing over the congruence factor), with HB females
recalling more adjectives in the positive mood condition and
LB females recalling more adjectives in the negative mood
condition.

Males Only

The data for males differs from the data for females in
that the only significant effect involving the congruence
factor is the condition by congruence interaction, F (1,82)
= 27.68, p<.001, MSe = 8.22.
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Figure 17
Condition x Congruence Interaction
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As can be seen in Figure 17, males recalled significantly
more congruent than non-congruent adjectives in the positive
mood condition and significantly more non-congruent than
congruent adjectives in the negative mood condition.

This

parallels the findings when both males and females are
included in the analysis, and also the findings for low
scoring females.

List Recall

Analyzing the recall data without including the subjects'
intrusions revealed a similar pattern of results as the
analyses with intrusions did, although the results for these
analyses were not as strong.

Significant condition by

78

congruence interactions were found in all the analyses
except for the separate analysis of the female data.
Although not reaching significance, trends toward a
condition by personality by congruence interaction were
observed in the analysis using the Splitting Scale as the
personality classification variable and in the separate
analysis of the female data.

A trend toward a four way

interaction between the condition, personality, sex, and
congruence factors was found when the MCMI-II BPD Scale was
used as the personality classification variable.

List Recall by MCMI-II Borderline Scale

A significant condition by congruence interaction, F
(1,148) = 5.61, p < .05, MSe = 5.92, and a trend towards a
four way interaction between the condition, personality, sex
and congruence factors, F (1,148) = 2.92, p<.10, MSe = 5.92,
was found for recall of list items.

As can be seen in Figure 18, subjects generally recalled
more congruent than non-congruent adjectives when in a
positive mood and more non-congruent than congruent
adjectives when in a negative mood.

However, as can be seen

in Figure 19, interpretation of this finding should be
tempered by the trend toward a four way interaction which
suggests that thi« holds true for all subjects except the HB
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females who recall about the same number of congruent and
non-congruent adjectives in both moods, although they recall
more of both types in the positive mood condition.

Figure 18
Condition x Congruence Interaction
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A significant main effect of sex, F (1,148) = 14.37,
pc.001, MSe = 13.07, a significant three way interaction
between the condition, personality, and sex factors, F
(1,148) = 10.19, pc.01, MSe = 13.07, and a trend toward a
main effect for personality, F (1,148) = 3.03, pc.10, MSe =
13.07, on the mean number of adjectives recalled (collapsed
over the congruence factor) were also observed.

As Figure

20 illustrates, while both HB and LB females recalled more
adjectives in the positive mood condition than HB and LB
males, and LB females recalled more adjectives than LB males
in the negative condition, in this condition HB males
recalled more adjectives than HB females.

Figure 20
Condition by Personality x Sex
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List Recall by Splitting Scale Score

Analysis of the data using the Splitting Scale score as
the personality classification variable reveals a
significant condition by congruence interaction, F (1,139) =
7.36, p < .01, MSe = 5.86, and a trend toward a three way
condition by personality by congruence interaction, F
(1,139) = 2.83, pc.10, MSe = 5.86.

Figure 21 is a graphical

representation of these results.

Figure 21
Condition x Personality x Congruence
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As can be seen in Figure 21, although high and low scorers
recall similar numbers of congruent adjectives in the
positive and the negative mood conditions, and although both
groups recall more non-congruent than congruent adjectives
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in the negative mood condition, low scorers recall
significantly more non-congruent adjectives in the negative
mood condition than in the positive mood condition, while
high scorers recall similar numbers of non-congruent
adjectives in both mood conditions.

Other effects found in this analysis were a significant
main effect of sex, F (1,139) = 12.5, pc.001, MSe = 13 .9 6, a
marginally significant personality by sex interaction, F
(1,139) = 3.76, p = .054, MSe = 13.96, and a trend towards a
condition by sex interaction, F (1,139) = 3.26, pc.10, MSe =
13.96, on the mean number of adjectives recalled (collapsing
over the congruence factor).

Generally, females recalled more adjectives than did males
(M Females = 8.53, M Males = 6.95).

High scoring females

recalled more adjectives than did low scoring females (M HBF
= 8.93, M LBF = 8.12), while for males this pattern was
reversed (M HBM = 6.49, M LBM = 7.41).

Also, females

recalled more adjectives in the positive mood condition than
in the negative mood condition (M F+ = 8.84, 1$ F- = 8.21),
while for males this pattern was reversed (M M+ = 6.46, M M= 7.44).
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Females Only

Analysis of the data for females revealed a trend toward a
three way interaction between the condition, personality,
and congruence factors, F (1,66) = 2.79, p<.10, MSe = 6.57,
and a significant interaction between the condition and
personality factors, F (1,66) = 9.15, pc.Ol, MSe = 14.34,
collapsing over the congruence factor.

Figure 22
Condition x Personality x Congruence
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As can be seen in Figure 22, HB females recall similar
numbers of congruent and non-congruent list adjectives in
both the positive and the negative mood conditions, although
they remember more of both types of adjectives in the
positive mood condition.

On the other hand, LB females
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recall similar numbers of congruent adjectives in both
conditions, but also recall more non-congruent than
congruent adjectives in the negative mood condition and more
congruent than non-congruent adjectives in the positive
condition.

Figure 23
Personality by Condition Interaction
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As can be seen in Figure 23, HB females recall more
adjectives in the positive mood condition, while LB females
recall more adjectives in the negative mood condition.

Males Only

Analysis of the data for male subjects revealed only one
significant effect.

There was a significant condition by
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congruence interaction, F (1,82) = 5.91, p<.05, MSe = 5.39.

Figure 24
Condition by Congruence Interaction
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As can be seen in Figure 24, males recall about the same
number of congruent adjectives in both mood conditions.
However, they recall fewer non-congruent than congruent
adjectives in the positive mood condition, and more noncongruent than congruent adjectives in the negative mood
condition.

Recall Without First and Last Six List Items

When the first and last six items presented to the
subjects were excluded from the analyses, no significant
effects were found in any analyses including the congruence
factor, although there was a non-significant trend toward a
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main effect for congruence in the analysis of the male data,
and a non-significant trend toward a two way interaction
between the condition and congruence factors in the analysis
when the revised Splitting Scale was used as the personality
classification variable.

The pattern of results for the between subjects factors in
these analyses was the same as the patterns observed in the
analyses of intrusions, list items and intrusions, and list
items.

Recall Without 1st and Last Six Items by MCMI-II Borderline
Scale

No significant effects involving the congruence factor
were found in this analysis.

However, a significant main

effect of sex, F (1,148) = 13.65, pc.001, MSe = 8.34, and a
significant three way interaction between the condition,
personality, and sex factors, F (1,148) = 8.32, pc.Ol, MSe =
8.34, on the mean numbers of adjectives recalled (collapsed
over the congruence factor) were found.
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Figure 25
Condition by Personality by Sex
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As can be seen in Figure 25, the HB females differ from
the three other groups in that they alone recall more
adjectives in the positive condition than in the negative
condition.

Recall Without 1st and Last Six Items bv Splitting Scale
Score

There were no significant effects involving the congruence
factor in this analysis, although there was a trend toward a
condition by congruence interaction, F (1,139) = 2.94,
pc.10, MSe = 4.05.

There was a significant main effect of sex, F (1,139) =
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12.32, p < .001, MSe = 8.86, on the mean number of adjectives
recalled (collapsing over the congruence factor).

Females

recalled an average of 6.4 adjectives, while males recalled
an average of 5.1 adjectives.

Females Only

No significant effects were found involving the congruence
factor.

However, a significant interaction was found

between the condition and personality factors, F (1,66) =
8.77,. p<.01, MSe = 9.02, on the mean number of adjectives
recalled (collapsed over the congruence factor).
is a graphical representation of this interaction.

Figure 26
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Figure 26
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As this figure illustrates, high scorers recalled more
adjectives in the positive mood condition, while low scorers
recalled more adjectives in the negative mood condition.

Males Only

No significant effects were found for any factors in this
analysis, although there was a trend toward a main effect of
the congruence factor, F (1,82) = 3.0, pc.10, MSe = 3. 4 8 .
On the average, males recalled more non-congruent than
congruent adjectives (M Congruent = 4.977, M Non-Congruent =
5.488).

Recall Results Summary

The results of the recall analyses support the
hypothesized general positive bias in recall.

However, the

hypothesized three way interaction between the condition,
personality and congruence factors was only found in the
analyses of the female data or when the Splitting Scale was
utilized as the personality classification variable and was
not in the form hypothesized.

Higher scorers did not show

recall congruence for both moods, but rather showed a
decrease in positive bias relative to lower scorers
regardless of their mood, recalling more negative adjectives
than other subjects in both mood conditions.

Higher scorers
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also remembered more of both the positive and negative
adjectives in the positive mood condition while lower .
scorers did not show this effect.

Of secondary interest was a consistent pattern involving
the mean number of adjectives recalled collapsing over the
congruence factor.

In the positive mood condition, females

recalled more adjectives than males, and HB females recalled
more adjectives than LB females.

In the negative mood

condition, however, LB females recalled the most adjectives,
followed by HB males, HB females, and LB males.

Chapter IV
DISCUSSION

Splitting

As noted in the introduction, the development and
utilization of the splitting defense is considered by many
psychodynamic theorists to be of central importance in both
the diagnosis and etiology of borderline personality
disorder.

While there are a number of different

conceptualizations of this defense mechanism (e.g. Kernberg,
1966 & 1975, Kohut, 1971, & Horowitz, 1977), these have in
common a theme of internal representations, images of self
and others, and/or memories being split along affective
lines.

Thus the borderline's pathology is thought to

involve the inability to integrate information of opposing
affective valences.

Therefore, as Marmar & Horowitz (1986)

have pointed out, when individuals with this defensive
organization are in one affective state, they have little or
no access to memories or information which would allow them
to modulate their feelings, thoughts, or perceptions.

As a

result, their perceptions of themselves and others have a
black and white quality that varies with their current mood.
The present study was based on the idea that one would
expect these individuals to demonstrate stronger mood
congruency effects for information related to themselves
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than would others.

Because of the practical and ethical

problems inherent in studying this clinical population, an
analog paradigm was utilized, with comparisons made between
higher and lower scorers on instruments designed to measure
borderline pathology and the splitting defense specifically.
As noted in the results section, the original hypotheses
were not supported.

The question that remains then is what,

if anything, does this study reveal about the nature of the
splitting defense.

If one accepts the notion that there is a continuum that
ranges from mental health to borderline pathology, and if
one accepts the idea that scores on the assessment devices
utilized in this study reflect an individual's place on that
continuum,

then this study would seem to suggest that mood

congruent recall is not involved in the splitting defense,
at least when individuals are in a relatively mild mood
state (the mean mood rating at recall in the positive
condition was 3.2, and in the negative condition was 4.7,
with a rating of 4 representing neutral).

There is a

problem with this interpretation, however, in that these
individuals did not show mood congruency in their selfreferencing either.

While the lack of congruency found in

the self-referencing results can also be explained by the
relatively mild moods reported by the subjects (the mean
mood rating at self-referencing in the positive condition
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was 3.2 and in the negative condition was 4.1), there is
also another problem with this interpretation, having to do
with the general continuum idea.

Theoretically, this

defensive organization is thought to develop at a very early
age (Mahler, 1968, 1971) and to be central to the
development of the whole personality structure (Kernberg,
1975).

Therefore, one would expect that an individual would

either develop this type of pathology, or would not.

In

other words, according to psychodynamic theories, the idea
of a person being a little bit borderline is similar to the
idea of a person being a little bit pregnant.
or may not be true.

This idea may

Unfortunately, this experiment (again

because of the mild mood states induced) did not provide
information to either support or disconfirm this theoretical
position.

Taking the above information into account, it seems to me
that the question of the relationship between mood congruent
memory and the defense mechanism of splitting remains open.
This is due in large part to limitations of the experimental
design.

These limitations, which will be discussed in the

following section, include the weakness of the mood
induction procedures utilized, and characteristics of the
subject population and the assessment devices used to
classify them.
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Limitations of the Experimental Design

As already noted, the moods reported by subjects in both
conditions and both portions of the experiment were
relatively mild, with all means less than one point from
neutral.

In contrast to this study, most of the studies

that have found significant mood congruency effects (e.g.
Teasdale, et al., 1980) only included subjects who
demonstrated strong responses to the mood induction
procedures.

In the same vein, it has been demonstrated that

the effects of mood induction procedures such as those
utilized in this study are fairly brief in duration (e.g.
Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983, Chartier, & Ranieri, 1989),
usually lasting only a few moments at most.

In this study,

because of the number of adjectives presented to the
subjects, the time that elapsed between the end of the mood
induction procedure and the complete presentation of the
adjectives was at least eight minutes.

It is likely that

the very mild effects of the mood inductions reported by the
subjects were greatly diffused in that time period.

Thus

the present study was in effect comparing two groups of
subjects who were both in basically neutral moods.

It is

this factor that represents the major flaw in the
experimental design.

The other factors that represent limitations in the
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present study are related to each other and involve the
assessment devices used to classify subjects and the nature
of the subject population utilized.

First, it is important

to recall that the subjects were drawn from a college
student population and can thus be considered to be
generally relatively high functioning individuals.

Also,

while the assessment devices chosen to classify subjects for
this study represented the best self-report measures
available of the splitting defense and of borderline
pathology, there are problems with these instruments.

The

only attempt at construct validation of the Splitting Scale
involved correlating it with two other personality measures.
A fairly strong negative correlation with a measure of self
esteem, and a positive (but weaker) correlation with a
relatively unknown Narcissism scale were obtained.

Also,

while the splitting defense is associated with Borderline
Personality Disorder, the self-report measures that have
been created to measure this syndrome have been found to be
confounded with depressive symptomatology and general
psychopathology (e.g. Edell, 1984, & Conte et al., 1980).
Although the MCMI-II Borderline Scale is more widely
utilized than most scales designed to measure this disorder,
Millon reports that this scale is also confounded with
dysthymia and anxiety, and that scores are related to a
factor interpreted as representing general maladjustment
(1987).

Given these facts,
ranges that

it is important

to consider the score

subjects obtained on these measures. As noted

in the results section, scores on the Revised Splitting
Scale

were

normally distributed and

ranged from20 to 64,

with a mean

of 35 in the low scoring

group, and a mean of 49

in the high scoring group.

This scale consists of 11 seven

point Likert scales and it is important to keep in mind that
a score of 44 could be obtained by endorsing 'neither agree
nor disagree' for each item.

Even if one considers that a

high score on this scale indicates that an individual
utilizes the splitting defense (which is in itself a
questionable assumption), there is no data available on what
constitutes a clinically relevant high score.

In any case,

given the score ranges that were obtained in this sample, it
is unlikely that more than a few of the subjects in the high
scoring group had scores that clearly reflected the
utilization of this defense mechanism.

As was also noted in the results section, scores on the
MCMI-II BPD scale were not normally distributed and the
variances of the high and low scoring groups were unequal
because of the influence of a few extremely high scores.
The obtained scores ranged from 0 to 76, with a mean of 9.5
in the low scoring group and a mean of 35 in the high
scoring group.

Millon (1987) suggests that raw score cut

off points of 42 “for males and 51 for females suggest the
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likely presence of this disorder, based on prevalence rates
of 11 and 14 percent respectively.

Again, only a few of the

subjects in the present study would meet that criteria.

It

should also be noted that as this sample was not drawn from
a clinical population, the base rates for this disorder
should be even lower, indicating the need for higher cut off
scores.

Thus it is unlikely that many of the subjects

obtained scores that would suggest the presence of
borderline pathology.

It could be argued that these characteristics of the
subject population and the assessment devices used to
classify them do not represent true design weaknesses,
particularly if one accepts the continuum idea.

However,

the lack of real construct validity of the MCMI-II BPD Scale
and the Splitting Scale may lead one to wonder whether these
instruments are measuring what they are purported to
measure.

Also, due to the exploratory nature of the

research, it would make sense to maximize the probability of
obtaining significant results by using actual clinical
subjects, as one would expect these individuals to be most
likely to demonstrate these effects.
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Discussion of Experimental Results

While on the surface, the results obtained in this study
appear rather complex, most of what was found can be
explained fairly simply by referring to what is known about
the personality measures utili 2 ed in the study, encoding
biases, self-concept, and gender differences in self esteem.

Generally, the results support the idea that individuals
in relatively neutral mood states demonstrate positive
biases in self-judgments and in either the encoding or
retrieval of information related to the self.

Both males

and females who are higher scorers on the Splitting Scale
and females who are higher scorers on the MCMI-II BPD scale,
however, demonstrate less positive bias than their lower
scoring counterparts.

In the following pages, these results

will be discussed in more detail.

Self-Referencing

As noted above, females who were higher scorers on the
MCMI-II BPD scale and all subjects who were higher scorers
on the Splitting Scale rated more negative adjectives as
applying to themselves than did lower scoring subjects,
regardless of their mood condition.

Male higher scorers on

the MCMI-II BPD scale rated more negative adjectives as
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applying to themselves than did lower scorers in the
negative mood condition only.

It makes sense that individuals who would endorse more
problems on a psychological test would also endorse more
negative adjectives as applying to themselves in this
experiment.

But why were the results different when the

MCMI-II BPD Scale or the Splitting Scale was used to
classify subjects?

And why were the results different for

males and females when the MCMI-II BPD scale was used to
classify them? To answer these questions, it will be helpful
to think about the nature of the two different scales.
Because the MCMI-II BPD Scale has many varied items that are
differentially weighted, there are a number of ways to
obtain a relatively high score on this measure.

The

Splitting Scale, however, is more brief and homogeneous and
negatively correlates with a measure of self-esteem.

It is generally accepted that women have more self-esteem
problems than do men (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).

Combining

this information with what is known about the two scales, we
can begin to make sense out of the observed pattern of
results.

Concerning the results obtained when utilizing

Splitting Scale scores as the classification variable, it
makes sense that higher scorers on this measure (individuals
with self-esteem problems) would endorse more negative items
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as referring to themselves than individuals without such
problems.

Also, while no item analysis was done to look at

the ways in which males and females arrived at their scores
on the MCMI-II BPD scale, it makes sense that the actual
items endorsed by subjects of each sex may have differed,
although their total scores did not.

Thus it is guite

possible that females who were higher scorers on this
measure may have endorsed more items reflecting low self
esteem than did males who were higher scorers.

What is particularly interesting about the results when
the MCMI-II BPD Scale was used to classify subjects is that
they seem to suggest a tendency toward mood congruence of
self-referencing in male high scorers (in a very mild
negative mood state), but a general lessening of positive
bias in female high scorers.

These results appear to

conflict with previous research indicating that women show
stronger mood congruency effects than males do (Clark &
Teasdale, 1982).

However, in understanding these results we

need to keep in mind the differences in self esteem noted
above.

Because of women's lower self-esteem, it is possible

that negative aspects of their self image are generally
available to them, regardless of their current mood state.
Males, however, may only experience these aspects of their
self- concepts while in a negative mood.
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Intrusions versus List Recall

The first question that one might want to ask is why would
subjects' intrusions be mood congruent while their recall of
list items was not?

To answer this question, it will be

important to keep in mind the fact that the mood ratings of
subjects in each of the two experimental conditions were not
very different from neutral.

As noted earlier, it has been

demonstrated in previous research that subjects who are not
particularly responsive to mood induction procedures do not
show recall congruency (e.g. Teasdale & Russell, 1983).
However, to my knowledge, researchers have not looked at the
mood congruency of subjects' intrusions.

If mood congruence

is a real phenomenon, then one would expect these pseudo
recalled items to be mood congruent and sensitive to subtle
mood states, as they are self-generated, and are not under
conscious control.

The fact that these were congruent in

very mild mood states is quite interesting.

While there

were no personality differences found involving the
congruence of the subjects' intrusions, it is important to
keep in mind the fact that the moods of the subjects were
not particularly intense and the scores obtained on the
personality measures may not have reflected either
borderline pathology or the utilization of the splitting
defense.
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Number of Adjectives Recalled

Another relatively simple and consistent finding involved
the numbers of adjectives recalled by different subjects in
the two mood conditions.

To understand this pattern of

results, it will be important to consider sex and
personality differences in the relevance of information
about personality traits.

It has been found that women are

more interpersonally oriented than are men (Gilligan, 1982).
Research has supported the idea that trait adjectives are
more generally meaningful and more often utilized in talking
or in thinking by women than by men (e.g. Clark & Teasdale,
1985).

It also seems reasonable to expect that individuals

who admit to having more problems would find such adjectives
to be more salient or relevant than individuals who admit to
having less problems. Therefore it makes sense that women
would generally recall more of these evaluative trait
adjectives than would men and that higher scorers would
recall more than lower scorers.

The one apparently somewhat

odd finding was the fact that women who were higher scorers
on the MCMI-II BPD scale recalled many more adjectives than
did lower scoring women in the positive mood condition, but
they recalled somewhat fewer than lower scoring women in the
negative mood condition.

One explanation of this might be

that the cognitive functioning of the higher scoring women
(who likely had lower self-esteem and/or were less happy
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generally) was more sensitive to the influence of a mildly
negative mood state than was the functioning of the lower
scoring women. This idea is consistent with previous
findings that depressive feelings constrain learning or
memory processes and cognitive functioning generally
(Breslow, Kocsis, & Belkin, 1981).

Differences in Positive Bias in Recall

As noted previously, higher scorers on the Splitting Scale
and female higher scorers who were classified on the basis
of their scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale did not show the
same degree of positive bias in recall as did lower scorers
on these measures or males who were higher scorers on the
MCMI-II BPD scale.

Why might this have been the case?

Research has shown that normal individuals develop what
have been termed self-enhancing biases (Taylor & Brown,
1988) and that depressed individuals demonstrate what has
been termed depressive realism (e.g. Alloy & Abramson,
1979).

More recent research has demonstrated the

development of self-perpetuating encoding biases (e.g. Hill,
Lewicki, & Neubauer, 1991).

The results of this study would

suggest that many individuals (the low scorers on these
measures and also the males that were high scorers on the
MCMI-II BPD Scale) have a somewhat pervasive tendency either
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to encode or to recall predominantly positive information
about themselves.

The higher scorers on the Splitting Scale

and the female higher scorers on the MCMI-II BPD Scale do
not show this bias, however.

This suggests that it is not that these individuals have a
bias to recall negative information, but that they lack the
positive bias that the lower scorers show.

Whether this is

the cause or the result of their lower self-esteem is not
clear.

However, it does suggest that they would likely be

more prone to depression than lower scorers on these measure
as they are more cognizant of negative information about
themselves than the lower scorers.

Why higher scoring males

differ from higher scoring females in this respect is not
clear.

However, as feminist theory suggests, male qualities

and males generally are more highly valued in our culture.
Thus males may be attended to and praised more often, which
may lead to the differences that are found in self-esteem
between the sexes.

In addition, males tend to have a,

different coping style than females.

While females tend to

spend time thinking about their problems, men tend to push
such thoughts out of their mind, and to take action to
attempt to solve their problems instead.

Thus males tend to

have more experiences of mastery than do women, leading to
increased self-confidence, self-worth, and life satisfaction
(McGrath, Keita, Strickland, & Russo, 1990).
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Implications of These Findings

There are a number of possible implications of these
findings.

For example, one wonders if lower scorers on

measures designed to tap into psychopathology are
individuals who have a bias to recall positive information
related to themselves, or whether they recall more positive
than negative information because they find it more salient
or relevant.

The evidence in this area is mixed.

It is

true that the results in the self-referencing and recall
portions of this experiment are generally parallel, but
although it has been found in previous research that
subjects recall items that they have rated as applying to
themselves slightly better than items that they have rated
as not applying to themselves, this result has generally not
reached significance.

If there is in fact a positive bias

operating, this could call into question the validity of
self-report measures of psychopathology, as individuals are
often not aware of their own maladaptive behaviors.

In

support of this idea is the fact that a number of subjects
in the current study did not endorse any problems or
negative adjectives as applying to them, and it would seem
likely that all individuals have some problems or negative
traits.

On the other hand, it is possible that, as previous

research has suggested, this lack of awareness and
distortion of reality is necessary for healthy adjustment
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(e.g. Taylor & Brown, Alloy & Abramson).

If this is in fact

the case, it would call into question some of the basic
tenets of insight oriented therapy, in which individuals are
encouraged to become aware of both their positive and their
negative characteristics.

Directions for Future Research

Unfortunately, this research was unable to adequately
address the original question regarding splitting and mood
congruency because of aspects of the experimental design and
of the subject population.

The mood inductions that were

utilized in this study were not powerful enough to enable
the study of this phenomenon, and it is also likely that the
subject population did not include enough individuals who
relied on the splitting defense to adequately test the
experimental hypotheses.

One also wonders whether the use

of an adjective list is the best way to get at individuals'
self-concept.

Given these factors, it would seem reasonable

to design another study to attempt to study the relationship
between mood congruent recall and splitting, with stronger
mood induction procedures, a clinical population, and
possibly a different recall task.

For example, having

subjects generate their own list of self-descriptors and
then testing recall at a later time might tap into selfconcept more accurately.

It would also be interesting to
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administer the splitting scale to two groups of subjects,
one group judged by their clinicians to utilize this defense
mechanism and the other group judged not to exhibit this
defense mechanism to see if this is in fact what this scale
is measuring.

There are also a number of further analyses of this data
that might be interesting.

One could perform an item

analysis on the subjects 7 MCMI-II Borderline Scale scores to
see if men and women did in fact arrive at higher scores
differently.

One could analyze the subjects 7 recall of the

items that they rated as applying to themselves and the
items that they rated as not applying to themselves
separately to see if different patterns might be revealed.

There are also a number of other possible projects that
this research has suggested.

One idea would be to correlate

scores on the MCMI-II BPD Scale and the Splitting Scale with
measures of depression and self esteem.
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Appendix A
MCMI II - Borderline Scale
(All keyed true - weights in parentheses)
Subjects are asked to say whether the following items are
true of them or not by marking true of false on the answer
sheet. If they can not decide about an item, they are
instructed to mark it false.
1.

(2) In the last few weeks I begin to cry even when the
slightest of things goes wrong.

2.

(1) As a teenager I got into lots of trouble because of
bad school behavior.

3.

(2) If my family puts pressure on me I am likely to get
angry and resist doing what
they want.

4.

(2) I often feel I should be punished for the
have done.

5.

(3) Other people seem more sure than I am of who they
are and what they want.
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. (2) I tend to burst out in tears or in anger for unknown
reasons.

7.
8

things I

(2) I began to feel lonely and empty about a year or two
ago.

. (2) My drug habits have often gotten me into a good deal
of trouble in the past.

9.

(1) Lately, I find myself crying without any reason.

10. (1) In the past I've gotten involved sexually with many
people who didn't matter much to me.
11. (3) My own "bad temper" has been a big cause of my
troubles.
12. (1) I don't mind bullying others to get them to do what
I want.
13. (2) I'm a very erratic person, changing my mind and
feelings all the time.
14. (1) I feel very tense when I think of the day's
happenings.
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15. (1) Lately, my strength seems to be draining out of me,
even in the morning.
16. (1) I began to feel like a failure some years ago.
17. (3) I have always had a terrible fear that I will lose
the love of people I need very much.
18. (1) I seem to go out of my way to let people take
advantage of me.
19. (3) Lately I have begun to feel like smashing things.
20. (2) I have given serious thought lately to doing away
with myself.
21. (1) Some people say I enjoy suffering.
22. (2) I often let my angry feelings out and then I
feel terribly guilty about it.
23. (1) Lately I feel jumpy and under terrible strain, but I
don't know why.
24. (1) I can't seem to sleep and wake up just as tired as
when I went to bed.
25. (3) I've done a number of stupid things on impulse that
ended up causing me great trouble.
26. (1) I never forgive an insult or forget an embarrassment
that someone caused me.
27. (1) I am the sort of person that others take advantage
of.
28. (1) I always try to please others even when I dislike
them.
29. (2 ) Serious thoughts of suicide have occurred to me for
many years.
30. (3) I can't understand it but I seem to enjoy hurting
persons I love.
31. ( 2 ) 1 don't see anything wrong with using people to get
what I want.
32. (1) I ran away from home as a teenager at least once.
33. (2) I very often say things quickly that I regret having
said.
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34. (2) For some time now I have been feeling very guilty
because I can't do things right anymore.
35. (1) I've become quite discouraged and sad about life in
the last year or two.
36. (2) I don't know why but I sometimes say cruel things
just to make others unhappy.
37. (1) I speak out my opinions about things no matter what
others may think.
38. (1) When someone in authority insists that I do
something, I'm likely to put it off or do it poorly on
purpose.
39. (1) I just don't have the strength to fight back
anymore.
40. (1) I often think that I don't deserve the good things
that happen to me.
41. (3) I feel pretty aimless and don't know where I"m going
in life.
42. (3) Sometimes I feel like I must do something to hurt
myself or someone else.
43. (3) My moods seem to change a great deal from one day to
the next.
44. (2) I don't blame anyone who takes advantage of someone
who allows it.
45. (1) I've changed jobs more than three times in the past
couple of years.
46. (1) For some time now I've been feeling sad and blue and
can't seem to snap out of it.
47. (1) I really get annoyed with people who expect me to do
what I don't want to do.
48. (2) In the last few years I have felt so guilty that I
may do something terrible to myself.
49. (1) I sometimes get confused and feel upset when people
are kind to me.
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50. (2) My use of so-called illegal drugs has led to family
arguments.
51. (2) There are members of my family who say I'm selfish
and think only of myself.
52. (1) Frankly, I lie quite often to get out of trouble.
53. (1) My parents often told me that I was no good.
54. (1) I deserve the suffering I've gone through in life.
55. (3) My feelings toward important people in my life often
swing from loving them to hating them.
56. (2) My parents always disagreed with eachother.
57. (1) I used to be really restless, traveling around from
place to place with no idea of where I would end up.
58. (1) I get very irritated if someone demands that I do
things his way rather than my own.
59. (1) Lately, I have gone all to pieces.
60. (1) I seem to encourage the people I love to hurt me.
61. (3) People who I admired greatly at first have often
become real disappointments to me later.
62. (1) I prefer to be with people who will be protective of
me.
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Appendix B
Splitting Scale
Subjects are asked to respond to items describing "how
people feel” by circling a number from 1 to 7 to indicate
whether the items are not at all true (1) to very true (7)
of them
*in the absence of a current relationship, subjects are
asked to recall their most recent relationship

1. I hate to hear someone close to me being criticized.
1

:

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. When I'm with someone really terrific, I feel dumb.
1

2

3

4

1

5

6

7

3. When I'm angry, everyone around me seems rotten.
_

_

_

_

_ _

_

_

4. My friends don't know how much I'd like to be admired by
people.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. It's hard for me to get angry at people I like.
1
6

~2

3

4

5

’

6

7

. It's very painful when someone disappoints me.
_

_

_

_

_

_

_

7. I have absolutely no sympathy for people who abuse their
children.
1
8

2

T~

4

5

6

7

. Sometimes I feel I could do anything in the world.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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9. There are times when my wife (husband)/ girlfriend
(boyfriend) seems as strong as iron, and at other times
as helpless as a baby.*
_

_

_

__

_

_

_

10. I often feel like I can't put the different parts of my
personality together so that there is one me.
_

_

-

4

5

~6

11. Sometimes I feel my love is dangerous.
_
_
_
_
_

7

_

12. When I'm in a new situation, there's often one person I
really dislike.
1

2

3~

4

5

6

7

13. It's hard for me to become sexually excited when I'm
depressed.
1

2

1

~

4

5

6

7

14. Some people have too much power over me.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix C
Image Distorting Subscale - DSQ
Subjects are asked to rate the degree to which they agree or
disagree with each statement by circling a number from one
to nine, with one indicating that they strongly disagree and
nine indicating that they strongly agree.
1. I am superior to most people I know.
_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

^

_

_

^

7

8

9

2. I often feel superior to people I'm with.
_

_

_

_

_

_

3. I ignore danger as if I were superman.
2

1

3

4

5

6

4. I pride myself on my ability to cut people down to size.
__

.

_

_

_

_

_

_

^

_

-

7

8

9

5. I'm a real put down artist.
_

_

_

-

6. I've got special talents that allow me to go through life
with no problems.
_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

^

-

4

5

6

7

8

9

7. I fear nothing.
-

— -

. Sometimes I think I'm an angel and other times I think
I'm a devil.

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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9. As far as I'm concerned, people are either good or bad.

1

2

3

4

5

7

6

9

8

10. I always feel that someone I know is like a guardian
angel.
_

_

_

_

“

_

7

!

i

9

11. There's no such thing as finding a little good in
everyone. If you're bad, you're all bad.
_

—

-

-

5

7

6

9

8

12. There is someone I know who can do anything and who
is absolutely fair and just.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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Appendix D
Screening Materials
Feeling Scale
Please respond to the following items that describe ways
that people feel by circling a number from 1 to 7, with 1
indicating that you strongly disagree and 7 indicating that
you strongly agree with the statement.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4
5
neither .
agree nor
disagree

7
strongly
agree

6

1. I hate to hear someone close to me being criticized.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

As far as I'm concerned, people are either good or bad.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am superior to most people I :
know.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I pride myself on my ability to cut people down to size
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. I ignore danger as if I were superman.
1
6

2

3

4

5

6

7

. When I'm with someone really terrific, I feel dumb.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. When I'm angry, everyone around me seems rotten.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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. I've got special talents that allow me to go through life
with no problems.
1

~ 2

3

4

5

1

6~

7

9. My friends don't know how much I'd like to be admired by
people.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. Sometimes I think I'm an angel and other times I think
I'm a devil.
1

2

3

4

:

5

6

7

11. It's hard for me to get angry at people I like.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. It's very painful when someone disappoints me.
1

2

3

4

5

6"

7

13. I have absolutely no sympathy for people who abuse their
children.
1

2

3

4

5

6

~7

14. Sometimes I feel I could do anything in the world.
T"

1

3

4

5

6

7

15. There are times when my wife (husband)/ girlfriend
(boyfriend) seems as strong as iron, and at other times
as helpless as a baby.
(if you are not currently involved in a relationship,
please recall your most recent relationship)
1
16. I'm
1

2

3

4

~5

6

7

6

7

a real put down artist.
2

3

4

5

17. I always feel that someone I know is like a guardian
angel.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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18. I often feel like I can't put the different parts of my
personality together so that there is one me.
1

~2

3

4

5

6

7

19. There is someone I know who can do anything and who is
absolutely fair and just.
1

2

3

4

'

5

6

7

20. Sometimes I feel my love is dangerous.
1

2

3

4

5

~6

7

21. I often feel superior to people I'm with.
1

2

3

4~

5

6

7

22. When I'm in a new situation, there's often one person I
really dislike.
_
_
_
_
.
_
7
23. I fear nothing.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

24. It's hard for me to become sexually excited when I'm
depressed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

25. There's no such thing as finding a little good in
everyone. If you're bad, you're all bad.
_

_

-

4

e~

5

7

26. Some people have too much power over me.
1

2

3

4

5

1

6

7
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Please circle the number that most accurately reflects your
current feelings.

R
I
G
H
TN
O
WM
YM
O
O
DI
S
:

very good

neither good
nor bad

very bad
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Personality Questionnaire

Please say whether the following items are true of you or
not by circling true or false for each item.
If you can not
decide about an item, please mark it false.
T

F

1.

In the last few weeks I begin to cry even when the
slightest of things goes wrong.

T

F 2.

As a teenager I got into lots of trouble because
of bad school behavior.

T

F 3.

If my family puts pressure on me I am likely to
get angry and resist doing what they want.

T

F

4.

I often feel I should be punished for the things I
have done.

T

F

5.

Other people seem more sure than I am of who they
are and what they want.

T

F 6 . I tend to burst out in tears or in anger for
unknown reasons.

T

F 7.

T

F 8 . My drug habits have often gotten me into a good
deal of trouble in the past.

T

F 9.

T

F10. In the past I've gotten involved sexually with
many people who didn't matter much to me.

I began to feel lonely and empty about a year or
two ago.

Lately, I find myself crying without any reason.

T

F

11. My own "bad temper" has been a big cause of my
troubles.

T

F

12. I don't mind bullying others to get them to do
what I want.

T

F

13. I'm a very erratic person, changing my mind and
feelings all the time.

T

F

14. I feel very tense when I think of the day's
happenings.

T

F

15. Lately, my strength seems to be draining out of
me, even in the morning.
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T

F 16. I began to feel like a failure some years ago.

T

F 17. I have always had a terrible fear that I will lose
the love of people I need very much.

T

F 18. I seem to go out of my way to let people take
advantage of me.

T

F 19. Lately I have begun to feel like smashing things.

T

F 20. I have given serious thought lately to doing
with myself.

T

F 21. Some people say I enjoy suffering.

T

F 22. I often let my angry feelings out and then I
terribly guilty about it.

T

F 23. Lately I feel jumpy and under terrible strain,
I don't know why.

T

F 24. I can't seem to sleep and wake up just as tired
when I went to bed.

T

F 25. I've done a number of stupid things on impulse
that ended up causing me great trouble.

T

F 26. I never forgive an insult or forget an
embarrassment that someone caused me.

T

F 27. I am the sort of person that
of.

away

feel
but
as

others take advantage

T

F

28. I always try to please others even when I dislike
them.

T

F

29. Serious thoughts of suicide have occurred to me
for many years.

T

F

30. I can't understand it but I seem to enjoy hurting
persons I love.

T

F

31. I don't see anything wrong with using people to
get what I want.

T

F

32. I ran away from home as a teenager at least once.

T

F

33. I very often say things quickly that I regret
having said.

T

F

34. For some time now I have been feeling very guilty
because I can't do things right anymore.
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T

F

35. I've become quite discouraged and sad about life
in the last year or two.

T

F

36. I don't know why but I sometimes say cruel things
just to make others unhappy.

T

F

37. I speak out my opinions about things no matter
what others may think.

T

F

38. When someone in authority insists that I do
something, I'm likely to put it off or do it
poorly on purpose.

T

F

39. I just don't have the strength to fight back
anymore.

T

F

40. I often think that I don't deserve the good things
that happen to me.

T

F

41. I feel pretty aimless and don't know where I"m
going in life.

T

F

42. Sometimes I feel like I must do something to hurt
myself or someone else.

T

F

43. My moods seem to change a great deal from one day
to the next.

T

F

44. I don't blame anyone who takes advantage of
someone who allows it.

T

F

45. I've changed jobs more than three times in the
past couple of years.

T

F

46. For some time now I've been feeling sad and blue
and can't seem to snap out of it.

T

F

47. I really get annoyed with people who expect me to
do what I don't want to do.

T

F

48. In the last few years I have felt so guilty that I
may do something terrible to myself.

T

F

49. I sometimes get confused and feel upset when
people are kind to me.

T

F

50. My use of so-called illegal drugs has led to
family arguments.

T

F

51. There are members of my family who say I'm selfish
and think only of myself.
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T

F

52. Frankly, I lie quite often to get out of trouble.

T

F

53. My parents often told me that I was no good,

T

F

54. I deserve the suffering I've gone through in life.

T

F

55. My feelings toward important people in my life
often swing from loving them to hating them.

T

F

56. My parents always disagreed with eachother.

T

F

57. I used to be really restless, traveling around
from place to place with no idea of where I would
end up.

T

F

58. I get very irritated if someone demands that I do
things his way rather than my own.

T

F

59. Lately, I have gone all to pieces.

T

F

60. I seem to encourage the people I love to hurt me.

T

F

61. People who I admired greatly at first have often
become real disappointments to me later.

T

F

62. I prefer to be with people who will be protective
of me.
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Appendix E
Subject Instructions

Please be seated at one of the desks that contains a packet
of materials, but do not look at the materials yet.
(WHEN EVERYONE IS SEATED)
If you do not have either a pen or a pencil, please raise
your hand and we will bring you one.
(WHEN EVERYONE HAS A PEN OR PENCIL)
In the study today, you will be participating in a number of
experiences involving various mental processes. Some of
these will involve judgments of various kinds, some of these
will involve concentration, and some of these will involve
reasoning. We will be asking you to rate your mood after
each task.
Please turn over your packet and fill out the first page.
This page will be separated from the rest of your materials,
and kept in a separate place, to ensure the confidentiality
of your experimental materials. Only the primary researcher
will have access to this identifying information, and only
so that you can be contacted again, if necessary. All the
rest of your materials will be identified only by a subject
number. Please print clearly.
Please do not turn the page until you are instructed to do
so.
♦First we
to really
questions
even want

would like you to listen to some music. Please try
get into it, as we will be asking you some
about your experience of it afterwards. You may
to close your eyes.

(PLAY TAPE)
(WHEN MUSIC ENDS)
Please turn to the next page on which you will find three
questions asking you to rate your experience. Please do
these ratings now.
(PAUSE)
Please raise your hand if you are not finished.
(WHEN EVERYONE IS FINISHED)
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Please turn to the next page.
We will now be presenting some adjectives to you on the
screen here. Each one will be presented for 5 seconds. For
each one, please circle yes or no to indicate whether it
applies to you. Circle yes if you think it applies to you
generally or if you can think of a specific instance in your
life in which it has applied to you. Please rate them in
order, from 1 to 54. Again, please do not turn the page
until you are asked to do so.
(PRESENT ADJECTIVES)
OK, now turn the page.
The next three pages contain arithmetic problems of
different types. Please work on these problems until you are
asked to stop. If you come to a problem that you are having
a hard time with or find frustrating, just go on to the next
one. If you happen to finish before we tell you to stop,
please just sit quietly.
(AFTER

8

MINUTES)

ok, you can stop now.
Turn to page 8 and rate your mood right now. Then turn to
the next page, which should be blank.
On the seat next to you, you will find a small booklet with
one statement on each page. I'll be asking you to read
through these booklets,
trying hard to get into the mood
states described by each statement. For each statement,
imagine a time when you felt like this and bring back that
feeling. Really try to feel the feelings. Its very important
that you become as involved in this as you can. Read through
the statements at your own rate. As you read each statement
think of a time you felt like that and imagine that feeling.
You can spend more time
on statements that you findreally
effective and less time
on statements that you findless
effective. Just repeat the statements to yourself into you
really feel that feeling. When you finish reading through
the booklet, read through it again, allowing your feelings
to build, ok, start now.
(AFTER 7 MINUTES)
ok, you can stop now.
Turn to the next page in your packet of materials, which
should be page 1 0 and rate your mood right now.
(AFTER 1 MINUTE)
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ok, please turn the page. Now I'd like you to write down as
many of the adjectives from the blue slides as you can
remember, in any order in which you remember them. Please
write clearly, but don't worry about spelling.
(AFTER 7 MINUTES)
ok, you can stop now. Before you leave you will need to come
up and sign the sheet to receive experimental credit. Also,
any of you who are interested in finding out the results of
the study can sign up on a special sheet, and the final
results will be mailed to you. Please don't tell other
students about the memory part of this experiment for the
next few weeks, as that could destroy the validity of the
study. If you have any questions about any part of this
study, you can contact Elizabeth Bell through the Psychology
department. Thank you very much for your participation.
(Play Happy music)

Appendix F
Mood Statements
(NEGATIVE CONDITION)
I FEEL UNHAPPY.
I FEEL SAD AND BLUE.
I FEEL FED UP.
I JUST FEEL DRAINED OF ENERGY, WORN OU T .
I FEEL PRETTY LOW.
THINGS SEEM FUTILE, POINTLESS.
I FEEL HOPELESS.
I FEEL DOWNHEARTED AND MISERABLE.
I FEEL SO TIRED AND GLOOMY THAT I WOULD RATHER JUST SIT THAN
DO ANYTHING.
I FEEL HEAVY AND SLUGGISH.
IT SEEMS SUCH AN EFFORT TO DO MUCH.
I'M FED UP WITH IT ALL.
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(POSITIVE CONDITION)

I FEEL PRETTY GOOD RIGHT NOW.
I FEEL HAPPY.
*»

I FEEL CHEERFUL, CONFIDENT.
I CAN THINK QUICKLY AND CLEARLY RIGHT NOW.
RIGHT NOW, I FEEL VERY CONTENTED.
RIGHT NOW, I FEEL LIKE SMILING.
I FEEL ALERT, HAPPY, AND FULL OF ENERGY.
I HAVE A FEELING OF LIGHTNESS AND JOY.
I REALLY LIKE THIS LIGHTHEARTED FEELING.
I CAN FEEL A SMILE ON MY FACE.
I FEEL SO GOOD I ALMOST FEEL LIKE LAUGHING.
IT FEELS GREAT TO BE ALIVE
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Appendix G
Subject Packet

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

NAME:___________________________

SEX: (CIRCLE)

FEMALE

MALE

AGE:______________________ ______

PHONE NUMBER:

13 7

PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT MOST ACCURATELY REFLECTS YOUR
EXPERIENCE

1. HOW INVOLVING WAS THE MUSIC? (HOW MUCH DID YOU GET INTO
IT?)
I_______ 2_______ 3_____ __4_______ 5_______ 6_______ Z
not at all
very involving
involving

2. WHAT WAS THE EMOTIONAL TONE OF THE MUSIC?
7
very
cheerful

very
sad

3. HOW DO YOU FEEL RIGHT NOW?

very happy

very unhappy
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53.
1.

YES

NO

2.

YES

NO

3.

YES

NO

4.

YES

NO

S.

YES

NO

6.

YES

NO

7.

YES

NO

8.

YES

NO

9.

YES

NO

XO.

YES

NO

11.

YES

NO

12.

YES

NO

13.

YES

NO

14.

YES

NO

15.

YES

MO

16.

YES

NO

17.

YES

MO

18.

YES

NO

19.

YES

NO

20.

YES

NO

21.

YES

NO

22.

YES

NO

23.

YES

NO
NO

24.

YES

25.

YES

NO

26.

YES

NO

27.

YES

NO

28.

YES

NO

29.

YES

NO

30.

YES

NO

31.

YES

NO

32.

YES

NO

33.

YES

NO

34.

YES

NO

35.

YES

NO

36.

YES

NO

37 .

YES

NO

38.

YES

NO

39.

YES

NO

40.

YES

NO

41.

YES

NO

42.

YES

NO

43.

YES

NO

44.

YES

NO

45.

YES

NO

46.

YES

NO

47.

YES

NO
NO

48.

YES

49.

YES

NO

50.

YES

NO

Si.

YES

NO

52.

YES

NO

YES

NO

139a

429

♦831

29
*24

♦86

84

92

92

728

±22

S_6

±645

534

18

±JL2Z

1414

42

854

12

±641

102

16

52

98

934

±54

JL_fi

367

87

691

14_L2

±224

±25

±425

193
♦2 4 9

48

K_4

763

43

±121

1412

963
-1 0 4

651
X 4

541

±_2

144

- 63

663
- 54

8266
- 152

K_5

14_2

98
K_fi

108

±542

102

±521

65

*_2

54

784

169
-9 7

67
♦56

957
-4 2 1

751
♦ 60

483

±6Z5

±6Zfi

3 23
- 15

1L.6

6

576
♦2 68

998
-6 8 7

27

645

95

14522

14_5

90

308

451

X_2

14_2

±_64

62
K_2

274

93
x 4

91
-

X_

2

±151

87

139b

23

731

305

X_4

=584

± 20

54 7

23

6235

±524

x64

±2140

50
+624

50

=34

602
X_5

74
*6 5 2

96 3

X_3

a_ 2

86

15

47 9

50 0

X l2

=_22

+121

*
864
+973

68

990

z_3

+280
i "?
4

34
JL_fi

3133

479

&_32

=222

624

87

+548

4L_2

=22

987

756

=584

=522

23
K_4

23 0
+ 89

645

50
-3 2

87
*_6

569
+ 123

9865

4356

+4765

=3328

587
+516

82
S_ 6

17
x16

4635
+ 78

=288

348

564

126
x 34

498
x 78

98
+ 1533

7895
X 25

429
-1 9 7

573
x 82

1534

86

1—284

a_ 2

+

96

7621

587

+-253

X_48

9832
+ 497

753
+ 1438

56
x78

7821
- 65 6

387
- 91

139c

4657
±_6 5 2

8672

86

♦■.625

JS_5

6428
»8559

7624
-4 6 8 1

5167

129

±5522

±652

82
K_ 6

286
*_ 1 2 .

925

715

±526

1S__5

65
♦99

87 7

134

8341

2419
-.-5 7

6284
.1.-4 6 7

78 9

421

356

9852
25

657
&-7J2

K—61

±_64

±254

X

846
-6 2 1

1234

664

IS_5

i_21

864
♦2164

12

864

±452

77 7

±522

7551
1 168

6241
x 65

*_2

5772
- 6 21

785

21
*6 5

75
♦2 4

9548
- 64

99
x45

1285
726

644

98251
*
1

644
♦982

854
X 8

741

573

432
x 9

6781
♦ 856

92

x21

764

±252

*_6

±622

6782
- 957

314
x 7

±5522

85

78

±211

755
♦944

919
^3527

441
- 32
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Please circle the number that most accurately reflects your
current feelings.

R
I
G
H
TN
O
W IF
E
E
L
:

very happy
unhappy

neither happy
nor unhappy

very
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Please circle the number that most accurately reflects your
current feelings.

RIGHT NOW I FEEL:

very happy
unhappy

neither happy
nor unhappy

very

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY
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Appendix H
Adjective List
kind

moody

sincere

self reliant

capable

energetic

unappreciative

patient

malicious

incompetent

lazy

dependable

gossipy

relaxed

greedy

modest

cowardly

oversensitive

grouchy

thoughtful

confident

jumpy

forgiving

talented

egotistical

loyal

humorless

boring

shallow

generous

easy going

rude

imaginative

intelligent

phony

warm

understanding

friendly

unfriendly

irresponsible

helpful

cold

observant

dishonest

mean

incompetent

pleasant

humorous

honest

maladjusted

pessimistic

jealous

careless

enthusiastic

sincere

